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THE ADAPTATION OF COPYRIGHT LAW TO VIDEO
GAMES
THOMAS M. S. HEMNESt
Video games are big business. The earliest games appeared in the
early 1970s,1 and by 1981, a single game, "Pac-Man," had generated
$150 million in sales over a thirteen month period2 and $1 billion in
revenues for arcade operators in the course of a year.' Sales of another
game, "Scramble," totaled $20 million over a two month period during
1981." Games played in arcades have become so popular that the man-
ufacturers have felt constrained to protest, perhaps too much, that the
games are not "reprehensible diversions for idlers." 5
As the video game business has grown, video game competition has
grown as well. "Galactic Invaders" wars with "Galaxian"; "Asteroids"
and "Meteors" collide; "Pac-Man" contends with "K.C. Munchkin. '
Video game owners and licensees are eager to stake out their market
shares, resorting in part to suits and threats of suits to achieve their
business goals. One video game purveyor, Atari, actually fielded a na-
tionwide advertising campaign warning that it "registers the audiovi-
sual works associated with its games," that it "considers its games pro-
prietary," and that it will "vigorously [enforce] these copyrights."
'7
Despite the hopes of Atari and its kind that the courts will protect
their market penetration, video games themselves are in many ways
perversely unsuited to traditional forms of legal protection, particularly
protection against copyright infringement. The owner of the copyright
t A.B. 1970, Harvard College; J.D. 1974, Harvard University. Mr. Hemnes is a partner in
the Boston firm of Foley, Hoag & Eliot.
1 One of the first video games was "Pong," which was introduced in 1972. Washington Post,
Mar. 11, 1982, at DC1 (District Weekly), col. 1.
2 See Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP.
(CCH) 1 25,363, at 17,045-46 (N.D. I1. Dec. 4, 1981), rev'd, 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982).
3 See Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1982, at 25, col. 3.
4 See Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 854 (2d Cir. 1982).
s Lippman, Warner's Atari Video Games are a Rocketship to Riches, Washington Post,
Nov. 8, 1981, at Fl, col. 1.
See cases discussed infra text accompanying notes 85-90, 106-22, 124-42.
See the Atari advertisement appearing in the November 1981 issue of Creative Computing.
CREATIVE COMPUTING, Nov. 1981, at 99. Despite the amount of litigation on copyright in video
games, suprisingly little has been written on the subject. However, a useful overview of the sub-
ject, including a detailed discussion of the interplay of the games and the computer software used
to operate them, is Jones, Video Game Litigation and the 1976 Copyright Act: The Idea of
Games, the Expression of Aliens and the Underlying Computer Software, 1 J. COPYRIGHT, EN-
TERTAINMENT AND BOOK LAW 17 (1982).
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in a popular game such as Pac-Man may be as jealous of its method
and pattern of play as he is about the particular colors and shapes of
the game's "gobbler" and "ghost monsters." 8 Furthermore, creation of
the game's method of play may involve significant creativity of the type
the Copyright Act is intended to protect.9 But affording protection to
the game's method of play is, at least superficially, inconsistent with
venerable principles of copyright law, in particular, those stating that it
does not protect "games," "methods of operation," "ideas," and "utili-
tarian" aspects of pictorial works.10 The limits of copyright protection
See infra text accompanying notes 124-42 for a more detailed description of Pac-Man and
its comparison with the similar game K.C. Munchkin.
" See infra text accompanying notes 212-15, 246-49; Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§
101-810 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Constitution empowers Congress to grant authors and
inventors monopolies to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. ... U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8. But the Constitution requires such monopolies to be "for limited Times." Id. If the
author's monopoly over a copyrighted work or patented invention were not limited, it would stifle
the very progress it is designed to foster. In the case of patents, Congress has chosen to limit
severely their duration-a patent lasts only 17 years-while permitting the patent to preempt all
other appropriation of the same "invention," no matter how expressed. See 35 U.S.C. § 154
(Supp. V 1981). The duration of copyright protection is very long-more than the life of a man.
See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (for works created on or after January 1, 1978,
copyright endures for the author's lifetime plus 50 years, unless the work is a work for hire or is
an anonymous or pseudonymous work, in which case it endures for 75 years from the date of
publication or 100 years from the date of creation, whichever is less). Nevertheless, the scope of
copyright protection does not extend any further than the expression of ideas found in the copy-
righted work. See infra note 10.
o The distinction between "ideas" and "expressions of ideas" is found in § 102(b) of the
Copyright Act, which declares: "[in no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated or embodied in
such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). By implication, only the expression of
ideas, of methods of operation, and the like receive protection. The policy that copyright does not
protect ideas is a vestige of an historically much broader exception to copyright protection. See
infra notes 216-25 and accompanying text. See generally B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF
COPYRIGHT, 1-38 (1967) (noting, at 14, that copyright once included only the exclusive right to
copy the original text and did not include any right to derivative works).
Like a theorem of geometry, the proposition that copyright protects only the expression of
ideas has corollaries. One is that copyright protects the design of a utilitarian work only to the
extent that the design incorporates "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspe ts of the arti-
cle." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). A second is that copyright does not protect games.
See I M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.18[H][3] (1982) (citing Chamberlin v. Uris Sales
Corp., 56 F. Supp. 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), affd, 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945)); see also Morrissey
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967); Affiliated Enters., Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d
958 (1st Cir. 1936). In practice, this seems to mean that copyright does not inhere in the rules for
a game, although the more arbitrary aspects of the game, such as the graphics and pictorial design
of a board game, may be afforded copyright protection. See infra text accompanying notes 20-27.
One rationale for the dogma is that the rules of a game are its idea and copyright does not protect
ideas, but only their expression. An alternative formulation, probably derived from Baker v. Sel-
den, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), is that the rules of a game are "utilitarian" and therefore outside the
scope of copyright protection. See generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra, § 2.18. Related to this is the
view that protection for a game's method of play or rules would require a patent. See 1 M.
NIMMER, supra, § 1.08[E], at 1-55 to 1-56. Although unusual, patent protection for a game is not
unheard of. The Parker Brothers Company originally protected its rights in the game Monopoly
by means of a patent. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 299
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must therefore be stretched if they are to serve the interests of video
game proprietors.
Against the backdrop of the blackletter law that "copyright does
not protect games," this paper will review recent decisions in which
courts wrestled for the first time with copyright protection for video
games." It will be seen that the early decisions swing widely between
cases in which courts disregarded or paid only lip service to the estab-
lished dogmas, resulting in extreme overprotection for the games, and
other cases in which courts applied the blackletter rules so unbendingly
that they provide little or no protection for the games. It will be argued
that the courts' difficulty in finding a good fit between copyright law
and the facts in video game cases is the direct result of three pitfalls of
copyright adjudication: the surprisingly persistent fiction that "ideas"
and "expresions" may be distinguished a priori without examining the
context in which the subject works are created and the policies underly-
ing copyright protection; the use of copyright to remedy trademark in-
fringement and other forms of unfair competition; and the use of the
"ordinary observer test" as a prescription for copyright remedies rather
than as a criterion for infringement. Some suggestions will be made for
avoiding these pitfalls, both in video game cases and elsewhere. Based
on the courts' struggle to adjust copyright law to video games, some
conclusions will also be drawn about the process by which law reshapes
(9th Cir. 1979).
" All video games are based on complicated computer programs, usually embedded in a
microprocessor chip. It is possible to copy a computer-based game by copying the underlying
program. In Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980), for
example, the plaintiff alleged infringement of copyright in a computer program capable of playing
chess. The court held that copyright in the program had been lost under the Copyright Act of
1909 by failure to place a copyright notice on the microprocessor chip embodying the program. Id.
at 1042-44. However, it is also possible to replicate significant features of a video game without
copying the program used by the copyright holder to operate the game. As the court said in Stern
Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman:
[Registering the program] would not have prevented a determined competitor from
manufacturing a "knock-off" of "Scramble" that replicates precisely the sights and
sounds of the game's audiovisual display. This could be done by writing a new
computer program that would interact with the hardware components of a video
game to produce on the screen the same images seen in "Scramble," accompanied
by the same sounds. Such replication is possible because many different computer
programs can produce the same "results," whether those results are an analysis of
financial records or a sequence of images and sounds.
669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing copyright registration of video game "Scramble").
The underlying computer program may be protected by one or more of copyright, trade secret law,
or (arguably) a patent. See Rilee, The Protection of Property Rights in Computer Software, 19
PUB. ENT. ADVERT. & ALLIED FIELDS L.Q. 265, 269 (1980); Jones, supra note 7, at 22-26, 44-
48. A discussion of the various means for protection of the underlying program is beyond the scope
of this Article. All of the video game cases discussed in the text involve alleged infringement of
copyright in a video game without alleged infringement or conversion of the copyright holder's
rights (if any) in the computer program used to operate the game. Cf Williams Elecs., Inc. v.
Artie Int'l, 685 F.2d 870, 872, 876-77 (3d Cir. 1982) (infringement of computer program alleged).
1982]
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itself in a new environment.
I. BACKGROUND-VIDEO GAMES COMPARED WITH "LEADING
CASES" ESTABLISHING THE BLACKLETTER LAW THAT COPYRIGHT
DOES NOT PROTECT GAMES
"Copyright does not protect games" is an example of a principle
of law that may have grown larger and more rigid than the facts of the
seminal cases warranted. For example, in Chamberlin v. Uris Sales
Corp.,'2 the plaintiff claimed copyright in a game called "Acy-Ducy"
and unsuccessfully attempted to enjoin the sale of the defendant's simi-
lar game. The proof showed that "the game, with some variations, is
the old Maskee game of India, taught to plaintiff by his grandmother,
when he was eight years of age." 3 The plaintiff alleged that he had
added a few new twists to the old game, but these few twists did not
persuade the court that he deserved credit for an original work of au-
thorship."4 Furthermore, the court doubted whether the similarity of
the defendant's rules and board to the plaintiff's proved that the defen-
dant had copied the plaintiff's game, because each party's rules and
board "applied to a well known game played by many for many
years."1" Thus, the court's holding could be explained on either of two
grounds sufficient in themselves-that the game was not an original
work of authorship or that copying had not been proven-without
reaching the question whether copyright can extend to a game under
circumstances when these other elements of infringement are proven.
Another venerable game case is Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gru-
ber."6 In Gruber, the "game" was a very simple promotional device
used to attact patrons to movie theaters and other establishments by
offering prizes selected on the basis of names and numbers drawn out
of a receptacle.'7 In denying relief, the court did not even reach the
infringement issue because the plaintiff had failed properly to plead
copyright infringement.' The court also dismissed the plaintiff's closely
related unfair competition claim, commenting that protection of such an
elementary principle for the distribution of prizes would grant "a mo-
12 56 F. Supp. 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), afld, 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945), cited in 1 M.
NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.18[H][3], at 2-212 n.69.
's 56 F. Supp. at 988.
14 See id. ("the parts claimed by plaintiff to be original with him have not been shown to be
such.").
15 Id.
16 86 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1936), cited in 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.18 [H][3], at 2-212
n.70.
17 See 86 F.2d at 959.
18 See id. at 961.
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nopoly to the plaintiff, preventing any other person from entering the
field." '19 This case is often cited for the proposition that copyright does
not protect games, but at most, the case holds that an action for unfair
competition will not lie for copying an artless commercial gimmick.
Despite the limitations of these "leading" cases, the principle that
copyright does not protect games has embedded itself in the law, subject
to one major exception-graphic and pictorial aspects of games (such as
the visual designs of game boards and playing cards) are said to be
copyrightable, as long as their copyright does not create a monopoly on
the "method of play."2 ° An example of a recent case exemplifying the
method-of-play/nonessential graphics distinction is Durham Industries,
Inc. v. Tomy Corp.21 Among other things, the case involved counter-
claims by Tomy that Durham's game "Mickey Mouse Peanut Putter"
infringed Tomy's copyright in a game called "Pass the Nuts." The
court found that Pass the Nuts and Mickey Mouse Peanut Putter were
"mechanically identical and structurally similar," each involving the
use of push-buttons to move an object from starting point to goal.22
However, the court described Durham's artwork for each game as "to-
tally different" from Tomy's.2' Tomy's Pass the Nuts was "designed to
make it appear as if a bear, a rabbit, a monkey and a squirrel are
attempting to throw an acorn from the ground up to the top of a
tree. 1" By contrast, Durham's Mickey Mouse Peanut Putter "features
Mickey Mouse, Minnie Mouse, Donald Duck and Pluto engaged in a
game of golf."125 Tomy argued that its copyrights protected the "sculp-
ture" of each game, but the court rejected this argument, holding that
Tomy had failed to identify any "sculptural" features which were not
also utilitarian.26
Cases such as Durham Industries, Chamberlin, and Gruber lend
themselves readily to the distinctions between ideas and expressions (or
games and their graphics) drawn by the statutory and blackletter copy-
right law. A first characteristic shared by the rules and methods of play
of the games in these leading cases is that they either were in the public
2" Id.
20 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.18[HI[3].
21 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980).
22 Id. at 914.
13 Id. By analogous reasoning, the court also concluded that Durham's game "Mickey Mouse
Star Ship" had not infringed copyright in Tomy's "Drive Yourself Crazy." Id.
14 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 914-15. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (definition of "Pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works") ("the design of a useful article [can be protected as such a] picto-
rial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.").
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domain or displayed a dismally low level of originality. Chamberlin is
the most extreme example, because the copyright holder in that case
failed completely to show any original work of authorship in the "Acy-
Ducy" game he sought to protect. Lack of originality characterizes the
games in the other leading cases as well. Using a steering wheel to
direct a toy car along a road, using a series of levers to push an object
toward a goal, and offering prizes on the basis of names or numbers
selected out of a receptacle are such elementary ideas that one might
question whether they constitute "original works of authorship" appro-
priate for protection under the Copyright Act.27
A second characteristic is that, unlike the methods of play, the
graphic elements in these games do reflect originality. Examples are the
animals in Pass the Nuts and the familiar Walt Disney figures in
Mickey Mouse Peanut Putter. Combining this with the lack of origi-
nality found in the games' rules, it is easy to conclude that copyright
protection should extend to the games' graphics, but not to their meth-
ods of play."
A third characteristic, related to the first, is that the plaintiffs in
the leading cases failed to show (and, indeed, probably could not show)
that they had made substantial investments in the games they sought to
protect. One guesses that thinking up a lottery based on names and
numbers picked out of a receptacle or inventing Pass the Nuts required
little more than a few minutes of the author's time. The Copyright Act
does not require any significant investment as a prerequisite to copy-
right protection. However, most plaintiffs in infringement cases seek
injunctive relief, which requires a showing of irreparable harm. With
good reason, courts routinely consider the size of the investment a
plaintiff stands to lose in assessing the question of irreparable harm.29
An injunction in effect confers a long-term monopoly30 for the copy-
righted work and any "substantially similar" work;"' a court would
therefore be reluctant to issue an injunction unless the plaintiff can
show a substantial investment of time or money or both. As a practical
matter, therefore, the size of a plaintiff's investment figures importantly
in many copyright infringement actions.
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) ("Copyright protection subsists . . . in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... "). For a discussion
of the relevance of originality to copyright, see infra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
28 See supra note 26 (quoting the distinction made in the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) between the graphic and the utilitarian aspects of useful articles).
219 See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Elecs., Inc., 672 F.2d 607, 620 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982).
30 See supra note 9.
31 For a discussion of "substantial similarity," see generally infra note 75 and infra text
accompanying notes 232 & 289-302.
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A fourth characteristic, best seen in Durham Industries, is that the
games in these leading cases easily lend themselves to, and become par-
adigms for, the seemingly self-evident distinction between the games'
"utilitarian" aspects, including their methods of play, and their more
arbitrary and "pictorial" features. In Tomy's and Durham's games of
moving objects toward goals using levers, for example, one can describe
the way the games are played without referring to the bears, rabbits,
and Disney cartoon characters Tomy and Durham employed to add
interest and appeal to the simple structure of the games.
Video games place great pressure on the statutory and blackletter
formulations because they have none of the above characteristics. Take
first the question of originality in the games' methods of play. 2 The
very idea of a video game did not exist until only a very few years
ago,33 and the games' methods of play have become extremely compli-
cated. The Durham Industries court described Pass the Nuts in three
sentences totalling sixty-four words.34 In Atari, Inc. v. North American
Philips Consumer Electronics Corp.3" the appellate court's description
of the video game "Pac-Man" required six paragraphs totalling more
than 700 words,36 and its description of the competing game, "K.C.
Munchkin" required at least equal verbal space.3" Although not dis-
cussed explicitly in North American Philips, it was implicit that sub-
stantial portions of the games' methods of play were not in the public
domain and were invented out of whole cloth by their authors.38
An additional distinction between video games and the games in
the leading cases is that the authors of video games invest at least as
much of their talent and originality in the creation of new rules and
methods of play as in the games' more arbitrary audiovisual effects."
For this reason, the graphics/rules-of-play distinction that appears in
the context of video games may save the chaff while discarding the
wheat-it would protect the occasionally mundane aspects of the games
such as the shapes of their characters and the beeping sounds they emit
while throwing the games' original and intriguing rules into the public
11 This Article is concerned primarily with nonmimicking video games such as Pac-Man,
K.C. Munchkin, and Galaxian, all of which are described infra text accompanying notes 85-90,
124-42. Such games should be distinguished from video versions of public domain games such as
baseball and basketball. For video versions of the latter games, originality in the basic rules of play
is obviously lacking.
" One of the first video games was introduced in 1972. See supra note 1.
34 See 630 F.2d at 914.
35 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982).
36 See id. at 610-11.
37 See id. at 611-13.
38 See the lower court's discussion of the method by which the author created K.C.
Munchkin. 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,363, at 17,047-48 (N.D. III. Dec. 4, 1981).
" See id.
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domain.
A third distinction is that video games can be costly and time con-
suming to create. Atari invested more than $1.5 million in "licensing,
developing, and advertising its 'Pac-Man' home video game."40 In
Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman,"1 the district court found that
"[d]evelopment of a new game requires substantial investment and
takes between eight months to a year."42 Just as the cost of creation is
substantial, the windfall to a successful infringer can be shocking. In
Stern Electronics, for example, the plaintiff had $20 million in sales
during the period from March 1981 to May 1981."' The defendant,
who was able to sell its "knock-off" game for $650 less per game than
the plaintiff,"' threatened to divert to itself a significant portion of these
lucrative sales. Such substantial investments by the copyright holders
and potential windfalls for the infringers generate powerful equity ar-
guments for granting speedy and broad injunctive relief to the copyright
holders.
A final distinction between video games and the games in the lead-
ing cases is that in many video games the rules of play are partially
disguised (from a copyright standpoint) in the games' audiovisual ele-
ments. One of the rules of Pac-Man, for example, is that the-"gobbler"
may consume "monsters" if the "monsters" are blue.45 Without careful
analysis of the game, one would describe the color of the monsters as a
graphic element of the game, rather than as part of a rule of play.
Similarly, the district court in North American Philips described K.C.
Munchkin as utilizing in its play "a practically infinite number of
mazes," appearing on a videoscreen.48 The mazes are certainly
"graphic," but as the lower court had noted, they affect "play tactics
and technique."1
4 7
40 Id. at 17,046.
41 523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aft'd, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
41 523 F. Supp. at 638.
43 See id.
44 Id. An illegal copying of a video game is "known in the trade as a 'knock-off.'" 669 F.2d
at 855. The district court described counterfeit models as "knock-ups," rather than "knock-offs,"
perhaps confusing illicit reproduction in the biological and computer programming fields. The slip
was rectified by the court of appeals, which otherwise affirmed.
4' North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 611.
46 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,363, at 17,046; see also 672 F.2d at 611 n.1 (describ-
ing "an almost indefinite variety of mazes.").
47 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,363, at 17,046. The Copyright Act proscribes relief for
"sculptural" features that cannot be "identified separately from, and are capable of existing inde-
pendently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(definition of "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"). If video games were considered graphic
works, and if the rules of play were considered "utilitarian" for purposes of the Copyright Act,
then copyright protection of video games could be very limited indeed. Cf. I M. NIMMER, supra
note 10, § 2.18 [H][3]. However, courts invariably characterize video games as audiovisual works
rather than as graphic works. See, e.g., North American Philips, 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH)
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In sum, strong equities favor the video game copyright holder;
originality is found in the games' rules, and a video game's rules tend
to be imbedded in its graphics. As will be seen, this combination of
factors resulted in early and surprisingly broad protection for copyright
in video games.
II. CASES APPLYING COPYRIGHT LAW TO VIDEO GAMES
A. Technical Considerations"
Before addressing the interesting question of the scope and nature
of copyright protection for video games, it will be necessary to discuss
briefly the more dreary issues related to the statutory requirements of
fixation and registration. These issues include whether copyright in-
heres in the game itself or in the computer program generating the
game and how one goes about registering a copyright claim.
It has become virtually a requirement of sound legal practice for
defendants in video game cases to include in their pleadings the argu-
ment that "the original work of authorship is the computer program"
which directs play of the game,49 and not the game itself. This argu-
ment has been uniformly unsuccessful. Every court addressing the issue
has held that video games are entitled to copyright protection as audio-
visual works independent of the underlying programs." In Stern Elec-
tronics, Inc. v. Kaufman,51 for example, the Second Circuit held that
the "visual and aural features of the audiovisual display are plainly
original variations sufficient to render the display copyrightable even
though the underlying written program has an independent existence
25,363, at 17,045; see also cases cited infra note 50; Copyright Act § 102(a)(6), 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(6) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (subject matter of copyright, "motion pictures and other
audiovisual works"). Section 101 of the Copyright Act provides that:
"Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a series of related images which
are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as
projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if
any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which
the works are embodied.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Moreover, unlike the definition of pictorial works in
§ 101 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), § 102 of the Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 102 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) does not require the expression of an idea to be "capable of existing
independently of" the idea itself. But see infra note 170 and text accompanying note 231.
4"8 The issues of fixation and deposit requirements discussed in this section appear in more
detail and from a different standpoint in Jones, supra note 7, at 27-35.
"' Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D. Md. 1981).
50 See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1982); Amusement
World, 547 F. Supp. at 226-27; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 479-80
(D. Neb. 1981); see also supra note 47 (citing sections of the Copyright Act pertaining to audiovi-
sual works).
51 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982), affg 523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
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and is itself eligible for copyright."52 The court of appeals also noted
that the defendants' argument overlooked the fact that original author-
ship occurred when "[slomeone first conceived what the audiovisual dis-
play would look like and sound like,"53 rather than at the later point
when the program was written.
54
A second refrain added to most defendants' pleadings is the argu-
ment that the audiovisual displays in video games lack the requirement
of "fixation" 55 because the sequence of sounds and images varies each
time the game is played, depending upon the player's actions. 58 This
defense has also been unavailing. The court in Stern Electronics found
that "the repeated appearance of the same sequence of numerous sights
and sounds in each play of the game defeats" the argument based on
the player's participation.57 In Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc.5s
the district court found the fixation requirement satisified by the game's
printed circuit board, "since the 'work,' the audiovisual presentation,
can be communicated from the printed circuit board with the aid of the
video game's display screen."59 In Amusement World, the court sum-
marily rejected a closely related challenge to video game copyrightabili-
ty. The defendants argued that a "video tape of one game sequence" is
not a "complete copy" of the work for purposes of the deposit require-
ments of the Copyright Act.60 In rejecting this argument, the court rea-
52 669 F.2d at 856.
53 Id.
The copyright holders in Stern Electronics did not register the computer program that
operates the game, probably for two reasons. First, registration of the program would not protect
the game because "it would not have prevented a determined competitor from manufacturing a
'knock-off of 'Scramble' that replicates precisely the sights and sounds of the game's audiovisual
display . . . by writing a new computer program . . . to produce on the screen the same images
...accompanied by the same sounds." 669 F.2d at 855. Second, most owners of computer pro-
grams attempt to protect them as trade secrets because copyright does not protect the sequence of
instructions to a computer which constitutes the program's value. See Comment, Copyright Protec-
tion for Computer Programs, 47 TENN. L. REV. 787, 797-98, 802-03 (1980). An essential element
of a tort action for misappropriation of a trade secret is that the information be a secret not within
the public domain, and the deposit required for copyright registration can constitute a disclosure
inconsistent with such secrecy. See Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Teim Eng'g. Sys., Inc., 522 F.
Supp. 367, 368-69 (N.D. Ill. 1981). But see Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870
(3d Cir. 1982) (instance in which copyright holder registered both audiovisual effects and program
underlying a game; copyright protection given to the underlying computer program). See generally
Jones, supra note 7, at 46-48.
a 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
" See, e.g., Stern Elecs., 669 F.2d at 855-56.
6' Id. at 856. The videotapes used for copyright deposit were by necessity tapes of particular
plays of the game, because the actual sequence of images and sounds, and even the game's dura-
tion, vary each time the game is played depending upon the actions taken by the player. See id. at
855; see also Williams Elecs., 685 F.2d at 873-75; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 2 COPY-
RIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,337, at 16,888 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 1981) ("When plaintiff applied for
its copyright, it submitted two video tapes of the game Galaxian being played.").
11 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981).
6' Id. at 226.
, Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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soned that the videotape is "alternative identifying material" 1 which is
an appropriate deposit, "[gliven the bulkiness and cost of the actual
video game . . 2
Although the courts' decisions on the foregoing issues seem unex-
ceptionable, a more subtle question related to the concept of derivative
works may lurk behind the issue of fixation. The video tape of a single
play of a game such as Scramble is comparable to the video tape of a
performance of a play. Each performance of a play will be somewhat
different, depending as it does on the actors' performances, just as the
play of a video game depends on the player's moves. If the performance
is fixed in a tangible medium such as a film or videotape, it may be
considered a derivative work which under the Copyright Act is separate
from the underlying script.63 Copyright in the derivative work is lim-
ited to the original elements in the derivative work not found in the
original work.6 Registration of a work is a prerequisite to suing for its
infringement, 5 and one might question whether registration of the lim-
ited original elements in a particular play of the game-a derivative
work-provides a sufficient basis on which to sue for infringement of
the unregistered underlying work. It is impossible to register every pos-
sible play of a game-the number is probably infinite-and the alter-
native of registering the computer programs which operate the games is
unpalatable for the games' owners because it could jeopardize their
protection of the programs as trade secrets.66 Furthermore, as the Stern
Electronics court of appeals noted,67 registration of the program might
not prevent the creation of similar audiovisual displays using different
computer programs.
These dilemmas may have academic interest, but the purpose of
copyright registration is to facilitate, not impede, the enforcement of
copyrights. For this reason, it would be inconsistent with the scheme of
the Copyright Act to imperil all protection for the games because of the
logical impossibility of "fixing" and registering anything more than an
example of a play of a game. The games aire undeniably works of au-
thorship and creativity to which copyright ought to accord some protec-
" 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.20(d), 202.21 (1982).
42 547 F. Supp. at 227. The court did not inquire whether these "identifying materials"
identified a derivative work-namely the performance of the game by a particular player. For
another case rejecting a defendant's argument on the fixation and deposit issues, see Williams
Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873-75 (3d Cir. 1982).
63 See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
- See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 3.04
(Scope of Protection for a Derivative or Collective Work).
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
See supra note 54.
67 See 669 F.2d at 855.
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tion. As long as the registered materials provide a sufficient foundation
on which to base a finding of substantial similarity between the copy-
righted and accused works, objections to the precise form of registration
(that the tape of a play of the game is a derivative work, that it does
not constitute a "fixation" of the game itself, and the like) descend to
the level of quibbles and have been quite properly rejected by the
courts. The Amusement World court brushed aside these technicalities
with an elegant rationale: it found that the tape of a play of a game
should be considered "alternative identifying materials" sufficient to
meet the registration requirements.6 8
There is, however, an important qualification to the Amusement
World rationale. If the deposited tapes were insufficient to provide a
basis for comparing the allegedly infringed work with the accused
work, then the action for infringement would fail, not because of a de-
fect in fixation or registration, but because the registrant would not be
able to prove substantial similarity between the copyrighted and ac-
cused works. It is to the more substantive matter of the assessment of
substantial similarity between video games that we will now turn.
B. Cases Finding Infringement
Of the earliest decisions applying copyright law to video games,
the leading example is the district court opinion in Stern Electronics,
Inc. v. Kaufman.69 The plaintiff, Stern, held an exclusive North and
South American sublicense for the video game "Scramble. ' '70 The dis-
trict court described Scramble as follows:
Stern's video game, "Scramble" . . . presents on a screen a series
of images projected by a cathode ray tube which depicts a space-
ship simultaneously trying to navigate a mountainous airspace, de-
stroy enemy fuel depots, evade deadly ground fire, and prevail in
any aerial dogfight, while at the same time watching carefully over
a diminishing fuel supply. In essence, the work is a movie in which
the viewer participates in the action as the fearless pilot controlling
the spaceship. 1'
Like other video games, Scramble had been registered with the Copy-
right Office as an audiovisual work, using a videotape of the game to
satisfy the deposit requirements of the Copyright Act.
72
See 547 F. Supp. at 226.
e 523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), afT'd, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
70 Id. at 637. The game had been created by a Japanese corporation, Konami Industry Co.,
Ltd. Id.
71 Id. at 638-39.
72 See 669 F.2d at 854; 17 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of the
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One of the defendants, Omni Video Games, Inc., marketed a com-
peting video game called "Scramble 2."' 3 The district court compared
the two games as follows:
At the hearing, this court viewed a videotape of plaintiffs
"Scramble" and defendants' "Scramble 2." The sequence of
images and sounds that appears on the screen when the game has
started - the "play mode" - is virtually identical in the two
games. The sequence of images that appears on the screen when
the game is not being played - the "attract mode" - is slightly
different. The Omni game's attract mode uses different wording
than Stern's and begins in a different phase. These differences in
the attract mode certainly indicate that the games are not identical,
but the two games are substantially similar.
74
Based on its finding of substantial similarity,"5 the district court found
a probability that Stern would succeed on the merits and entered an
order granting Stern sweeping injunctive relief. The court preliminarily
enjoined Omni "from infringing in any manner plaintiff's copyright in
the audiovisual work entitled 'Scramble.'", The court also impounded
"all of [the] defendants' 'Scramble 2' video games or any other copies of
plaintiff's 'Scramble' audiovisual work that infringe plaintiff's copy-
right and are under defendants' control."" Finally, the court found
that the defendants had infringed Stern's trademark rights in the mark
"Scramble" and enjoined the defendants from further use of that
mark.78 From a defendant's point of view, the preliminary relief was
calamitous.
Considering the potency of its remedies, the district court's deci-
sion on the nature and scope of Stern's copyright in the game Scramble
is less than convincing. The court failed completely to address the ques-
tion whether the similarity it saw between "Scramble" and "Scramble
2" was the necessary consequence of their being based on the same
idea, employing the same method of play. In particular, the court did
not inquire whether any video game about the trials and tribulations of
Copyright Act registration and deposit requirements in the video game context, see supra notes 48-
68 and accompanying text.
73 See Stern Elecs., 523 F. Supp. at 637.
74 Id. at 639.
78 A work which is not identical to a copyrighted work can still infringe the copyrighted
work if the two works are "substantially similar." See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03[A].
See also infra text accompanying notes 232 & 289-302. The Stern court of appeals did not reach
the issue of substantial similarity. See 669 F.2d at 857.
71 523 F. Supp. at 641-42.
7 Id. at 642.
78 See id. Although the first person to use a trademark generally has prior rights on the mark
and Omni had been first to use the mark "Scramble," the court found for Stern on the ground that
Omni's prior use had not been in good faith. See id. at 641; see also 669 F.2d at 857.
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a spaceship moving through enemy territory would necessarily be at
least as similar to Stern's game as Scramble 2 was. If so, then there
would be a strong argument that Stern was improperly seeking to pro-
tect the idea of a game involving a "space-ship" in enemy territory.
The court based its holding that the games were substantially similar
on its impression that the two games were similar in appearance rather
than on an analysis of the difficult problem of applying the idea/ex-
pression distinction in the video game setting.
79
Other early cases finding copyright infringement of video games
posed similar issues of substantial similarity, and the courts' opinions in
those cases contained analogous failures to address the idea/expression
issue. For example, in Atari, Inc. v. Armenia, Ltd.,80 plaintiff Atari
charged that the defendants' video game "War of the Bugs" infringed
Atari's copyright of its game "Centipedes." Concluding that the two
games were substantially similar, the court acknowledged that the simi-
larity between the two games did not extend to "the color and shape of
the objects and so on."81 The points of similarity the court found were
in such aspects as how the "worms" "travel" and how the "shots" are
"fired," '82 elements that could easily be characterized as "methods of
operation" for purposes of section 102(b) of the Copyright Act.83
This finding might have led to the conclusion that Armenia had
's See 523 F. Supp. at 639; see also infra text accompanying notes 211-15; c. Amusement
World, 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,347, at 16,961-62 ("[Ilt is not enough to observe that
there are a great number of similarities in expression between the two games. It is necessary to
determine whether the similar forms of expression are forms of expression that simply cannot be
avoided in any version of the basic idea .... ").
s0 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,328 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 1981). The opinion, which is
published as the transcript of a decision rendered from the bench, draws an interesting comparison
between biological categories and the levels on which the two games were similar:
I may say, if I may make a little homely example, if I were a biologist and the
machines were animals, belonged to the animal kingdom in place of being machines
and belonged to the material world, shall we say-and I were a biologist and there
was a controversy concerning homeds [sic], I would have to find that both of these
machines where homo sapiens; in other words, they were both, at least members of
the same type or species.
I think I would have to go further - I know I would have to go further from
all of the evidence in front of me and find that they belonged to the same family.
I would even have to go further but not as far as counsel for the plaintiff says
- they are not identical twins. In fact, they are not twins at all, but, in my judg-
ment, they are brothers.
Id. at 16,845. The court concluded:
And having examined all of the evidence, as I have said, I find that the plain-
tiff has shown, first, that there is substantial similarity between the accused device
or devices and the plaintiff's device or machine, or whatever you wish to call it, and
so similar that the court in viewing them, except for the color and the shape of the




s3 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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copied only the methods of operation for Atari's Centipedes, implying
that no action for copyright infringement should lie." As in Stern Elec-
tronics, however, exactly the opposite occurred. The Armenia court
found for the plaintiff without even attempting to draw a distinction
between the games' methods of play on the one hand and their more
arbitrary graphic elements on the other. By failing to distinguish the
games' rules from their graphics, the court's decision enjoining Armenia
from selling War of the Bugs could be interpreted as granting Atari a
long-term monopoly on bug games, just as Stern Electronics appears to
grant Stern an equally long-term monopoly on spaceship games.
In other instances, allegations of video game infringement did not
engage as vividly the problem of distinguishing idea and expression. In
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider,8 5 the plaintiff alleged infringement
by the defendants of three games at once: "Galaxian" (by the defen-
dants' "Galactic Invaders" and "Kamikaze III"), "Pac-Man" (by
"Mighty Mouth") and "Rally-X" (by "Rally-X"). 8 The court found
that "[a] comparison of the defendants' games and the plaintiff's games
shows that the games are virtually identical." ' In support of this re-
sult, the court provided a convincing recitation of identical features, de-
scending even to such particulars as the way the wings of Galaxian's
and Galactic Invaders' aliens "extended upward in a stationary posi-
tion" as the aliens "swoop[ed] down on the defense ship." ' As in Stern
Electronics, the Dirkschneider court also found a likelihood that defen-
dants had infringed plaintiff's trademarks.8" The court found that non-
functional features of Midway's games, such as the shape and appear-
ance of the characters in Midway's games, had acquired a secondary
meaning so that "the ordinary consumer viewing the attract mode
would likely think the game being advertised was the plaintiff's." 0
A different form of infringement was alleged in Midway Manu-
facturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc.,91 and, correspondingly, the
court's holding shows a different sort of overbreadth. Defendant Artic
" See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
*5 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981).
86 See id. at 472-77. The Dirkschneider court found fixation in the games' printed circuit
boards, see id. at 480, and found the Copyright Act's deposit requirement satisfied by Atari's
deposits of videotapes of "each of its games in their attract and play modes," id. at 480-81. Presag-
ing Amusement World, Dirkschneider also recognized that ideas are not copyrightable, but found
that "[t]he plaintiff's copyrights cover the plaintiff's audiovisual expression of various game ideas
[including] the distinctive color and design of the space ships and other players, as well as the
sounds accompanying the playing of the games." Id. at 480.
87 Id. at 482.
" Id.
89 See id. at 484-90.
10 Id. at 488.
91 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,337 (N.D. III. June 2, 1981).
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allegedly marketed a speed-up kit for plaintiff Midway's video game
"Galaxian."92 Artic moved for summary judgment on the ground that
it had "not copied plaintiff's work or induced others to copy that
work.""3 Midway countered that "an infringement arises regardless of
whether defendant itself has copied the protected work" and that "the
sale of the speed-up kits enables others to make and perform unautho-
rized alterations of plaintiff's copyrighted material." '94 Midway's theory
was that playing Galaxian with the speed-up kit produced visual
images "substantially similar to the visual images originally copy-
righted," thus "creating an unauthorized derivative work."95 Midway
did not allege that it marketed or intended to market any similar speed-
up kits.
To approach this issue, the court examined at length the Copy-
right Act's policies of rewarding individuals for their "unique creative
efforts" and of providing "an incentive for individuals to engage in ar-
tistic endeavors by forbidding any other person from copying their orig-
inal expression of ideas."9 6 The court omitted to mention the counter-
vailing policy of limiting the scope of the protected rights so that other
authors are not crowded out of arenas for the exercise of their creative
efforts. 97 In its opinion denying the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the court said:
As noted, the copyright law is designed to reward creative and
artistic endeavors. It gives the author the exclusive right to dis-
tribute copies of that work and make derivative works from the
original. If defendant's device is designed and used solely to modify
plaintiff's visual image, then plainly defendant's device would only
have value because of plaintiff's particular copyrighted audio visual
work. Defendant, thus, by selling its device reaps the benefits of
plaintiff's artistic endeavor. Such conduct would be violative of
93 See id. at 16,884, 16,890-92. Midway also alleged that Artic sold "electronic devices that
are intended to simulate Midway's Galaxian and Pac-Man games." Id. at 16,844. The court's
opinion dealt, inter alia, with Artic's motion for summary judgment, and therefore assumed, for
purposes of that motion, that Midway's allegations were true.
93 Id. at 16,890.
" Id. The issue raised was similar to the contributory infringement issues in the Betamax
case, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102
S. Ct. 2926 (1982) (No. 81-1687). Only the district court decision in Sony, 480 F. Supp. 429
(C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), was available
when the Midway v. Artic court rendered its opinion. See 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,337,
at 16,892.
95 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,337, at 16,891.
Id. at 16,890.
" Cf£ Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.)
(holding there was no copyright infringement when similarities between two plays were only in
the ideas and not in the expression), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
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§ 106(2) [of the Copyright Act]."8
This dicta is remarkable in that it ignores the fact that Artic's
speed-up kit was not sold as, and apparently could not be used as, a
substitute for Midway's Galaxian game. 9 Thus, the sale of the speed-
up kit could not have reduced Midway's Galaxian sales, even if, as the
court hypothesized, the speed-up kit could only be used with the
Galaxian game. Indeed, the speed-up kit could be expected to enhance
Galaxian sales, because the added challenge of greater speed probably
made the game attractive to a broader segment of the video game
market.
The Galaxian speed-up kit has a converse analogy in the field of
literature. Difficult literary books such as James Joyce's Ulysses and
Finnegans Wake have spawned commentaries such as Gilbert's James
Joyce's Ulysses °" and Tindall's A Reader's Guide to Finnegans
Wake.101 One might consider these commentaries to be Joyce slow-
down kits. They explain Joyce's works in a way that makes them more
accessible to the ordinary reader. Indeed, many readers might not
purchase Joyce's books if such assistance were not available. Like the
Galaxian speed-up kit, commentaries such as James Joyce's Ulysses
are useful solely as a result of the underlying work. The commentaries
have no value in connection with any other work. Thus, to use the
Midway v. Artic court's phrase, the commentator's work "would only
have value because of [the original author's] copyrighted . . . work,"
and the commentator thus "reaps the benefits of the [original author's]
artistic endeavor." 102 Should one therefore conclude that literary com-
mentators and critics must obtain the permission of the holders of copy-
right in the works on which they comment?
Both tradition and the Copyright Act hold that off-shoots such as
commentary, criticism, and parody are not infringing, 03 despite the fact
98 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,337, at 16,891. The court also said that "if defendant's
device is one which enhances all video games, it would be anomalous to apply the copyright laws
to inhibit its distribution." Id. Note that section 106(2) of the Copyright Act grants the owner of a
copyright exclusive rights to prepare derivative works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
" See id. at 16,884 (The speed-up kits were described as "devices that are designed to be
inserted into Midway's Galaxian game to speed up and otherwise alter the play of the game").
100 S. GILBERT, JAMES JOYCE'S ULYSSES (1930).
101 W. TINDALL, A READER'S GUIDE TO FINNEGANS WAKE (1969). Tindall's book reprints
excerpts from FINNEGANS WAKE with permission. See W. TINDALL, supra, at iv. The author has
examined the certificates of copyright registration for both the Gilbert and Tindall works. Neither
is described in its certificate as a derivative work.
'02 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,337, at 16,891.
,O See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) ("the fair use of a copyrighted work...
for purposes such as criticism [and] comment. . . is not an infringement of copyright"); L. SELT-
ZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 43-45 (1978); 3 NIMMER, supra note 10, §
13.05[C]; KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 68-69.
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that such works are fundamentally parasitic on the work of the original
author. The commentary must not paraphrase or quote so extensively
that it becomes a substitute for the original,"" but this consideration
does not even arise in the case of of the Galaxian speed-up kit, because
the purchaser of the speed-up kit cannot use it unless he also purchases
a copy of the Galaxian game. If the Midway v. Artic court's analysis
were applied to literature, all commentary, criticism, and parody would
require a license from the original copyright holder. Not all criticism is
friendly; not all parody is kind. One can imagine that authors would
grant licenses for such works on a very selective basis indeed.
C. Cases Finding No Infringement
The dicta quoted above from Midway v. Artic is perhaps the most
extreme example of the expanded copyright protection courts are will-
ing to provide for the owners of video games. Similar disregard for the
traditional bounds of copyright is, as we have seen, evident in Stern
Electronics v. Kaufman and Atari v. Armenia.10 5 Not all courts, how-
ever, have overlooked traditional principles in applying copyright to
video games. One of the most thoughtful opinions attempting to apply
those principles in this new context is Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World,
Inc.106 In Amusement World, Atari, again the plaintiff, and in this case
the owner of a video game called "Asteroids," sought to enjoin defen-
dants "from manufacturing or distributing any product in violation of
plaintiff's copyright.""0 ' In particular, Atari alleged that Amusement
World's video game "Meteors" was substantially similar to, and there-
fore an infringement of, Atari's Asteroids.'0"
The court did not satisfy itself with infringement analysis based on
a superficial impression of the similarities between the games, nor did it
focus on the conduct of the parties. Instead, it catalogued twenty-two
"design features" which the games shared and nine respects in which
the games differed.' 0 9 The similarities identified by the court ranged
from those as general as the fact that both games presented an "over-
head view of the battle field" 0 to those as minute as the fact that
04 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107(3) - 107(4) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (factors bearing on question of
fair use include "amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole" and "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work").
'01 See supra notes 69-84 and accompanying text.
10" 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981).
107 Id. at 224.
log See id.
109 Id. at 224-25.
110 Id. at 225.
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"[tihere is a two-tone beeping noise in the background throughout the
game, and the tempo of the noise increases as the game progresses." '111
The nine differences included, for example, the facts that "'Meteors' is
in color, while 'Asteroids' is in black and white," "the rocks in 'Mete-
ors' appear to tumble as they move across the screen," and "the pace of
the 'Meteors' game is faster at all stages.
M12
The Amusement World court went beyond earlier decisions such
as Stern Electronics and Midway v. Artic by examining carefully the
questions whether the plaintiff was claiming copyright in an idea and
whether the two games could be considered "substantially similar"
without rending the delicate veil separating ideas from their expres-
sions. The court first rejected the defendants' contention that Atari's
copyright claim was void in its entirety because it attempted to monop-
olize "the idea of a video game in which the player fights his way
through asteroids and spaceships." 1 3 In rejecting this contention, the
court said:
Thus, when plaintiff copyrighted his particular expression of the
game, he did not prevent others from using the idea of a game with
asteroids. He prevented only the copying of the arbitrary design
features that makes [sic] plaintiff's expression of this idea unique.
These design features consist of the symbols that appear on the
display screen, the ways in which those symbols move around the
screen, and the sounds emanating from the game cabinet. Defen-
dants are entitled to use the idea of a video game involving aster-
oids, so long as they adopt a different expression of the idea-i.e.,
a version of such a game that uses symbols, movements, and sounds
that are different from those used in plaintiffs game. 1
The quoted passage is one of the more careful and explicit judicial
efforts to apply the idea/expression dichotomy to video games, and it
spelled defeat for Atari's infringement action. The court observed that
the mere fact that "there are a great number of similarities in expres-
sion" between Meteors and Asteroids does not imply infringement of
one by the other. 1 5 Instead, "[ilt is necessary to determine whether the
similar forms of expression are forms of expression that simply cannot
be avoided in any version of the basic idea of a video game involving
space rocks."116 The court held that "most of these similarities [be-
tween the two games] are inevitable, given the requirements of the idea
" Id. at 224.
12 Id. at 225.
113 Id. at 227.
114 Id.
15 Id. at 229.
11 Id. (Footnote omitted).
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of a game involving a spaceship combatting space rocks and given the
technical demands of the medium of a video game.1 117 On this ground,
the court denied Atari's motion for a preliminary injunction and en-
tered judgment for the defendant.11
Although the Amusement World court's readiness to tackle the
idea/expression distinction is laudable, one might question whether the
court's holding does not rest on an overbroad view of the idea of a space
rocks game. In effect, the court assumed that every rule of play must be
an "idea" for purposes of section 102(b) of the Copyright Act. It is
worth asking whether this necessarily follows. An important attribute
of "ideas" for purposes of section 102(b) appears to be generality.119
Such generality is probably present in "the idea of a video game in
which a player fights his way through asteroids and spaceships. '120 By
comparison, some of the twenty-two points of similarity identified by
the court are so particularized that they could more easily be said to
involve the "expression" of the basic idea rather than an idea in them-
selv*es. Examples are the two-tone beeping noise which increases in fre-
quency as each game progresses, the "three sizes of rocks" employed by
each game, and the pattern of asteroid decay in each game: "[w]hen hit,
a large rock splits into two medium rocks, a medium rock splits into
two small ones; and a small rock disappears." '21 On the other hand,
many other points of similarity, including for instance the player's con-
trol of one space ship under attack by enemy ships, the shared rule that
"[wihen a rock hits the player's spaceship, the ship is destroyed," and
the joint feature that "[tihe player's ship and enemy ships shoot projec-
tiles" 22 seem by their generality to be better candidates for the "idea"
category.
These considerations suggest that although some aspects of Mete-
ors may have infringed Asteroids' expression, in other respects the
games deserved to coexist. It is not unprecedented for courts to tailor
relief in copyright infringement cases to the precise outlines of the area
of infringement, and a selection of the most particularized items on the
court's list of similarities could have been used to define an injunction
limited to improperly copied "expression." 12 The Amusement World
117 Id.
118 See id. at 230.
See infra text accompanying notes 229-31.
'"0 Amusement World, 547 F. Supp. at 227.
1 Id. at 224.
122 Id.
123 See Breffort v. I Had a Ball Co., 271 F. Supp. 623, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (issuing an
injunction against infringing plaintiff's work, but expressly excluding from the injunction certain
noninfringing uses of music and lyrics); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 14.06[B], at 14-53 ("The
defendant may be able to avoid a permanent injunction if the infringing portion of defendant's
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court, however, does not appear to have even considered such relief,
and, by making a unitary finding of noninfringement, the court's hold-
ing blurs the very distinction between idea and expression that it had
been so careful to draw in its opinion.
Few courts have held for the defendant in a case of alleged video
game infringement. One is Amusement World, and another is the dis-
trict court's opinion, subsequently reversed, in Atari Inc. v. North
American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp.124 In North American
Philips, Atari and its co-plaintiff, Midway Manufacturing Co., alleged,
among other things, that North American's game K.C. Munchkin in-
fringed Atari's and Midway's rights in Pac-Man.125 In a lengthy opin-
ion, the district court denied plaintiffs' prayer for a preliminary injunc-
tion "barring defendants. . . from advertising, distributing, displaying,
performing, selling, or offering for sale, the 'K.C. Munchkin' home
video game, or in any other manner violating plaintiffs' exclusive rights
under the copyright in the 'Pac-Man' audio-visual work."12
As in Amusement World, the district court opinion in North
American Philips compared the two works in great detail. The court
found both Pac-Man and K.C. Munchkin to be "maze-chase"
games127 -each game features on its video screen a maze or mazes. 2"
The player in each game controls a "central character" which moves
through the maze, gobbling "dots" as it moves.12 A further similarity
is that the central character in each game is subject to attack by other
figures (called by the district court "munchers" for K.C. Munchkin and
"goblins" for Pac-Man).130 These attacking figures are not controlled
by the player." 1 The object of each game is to score points by causing
work can be removed without destroying the usefulness of the remainder of the work."). See
generally infra text accompanying notes 303-15.
124 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (COH) 25,363 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 1981), rev'd, 672 F.2d 607 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982). The court of appeals opinion is dis-
cussed infra text accompanying notes 161-209. Another case finding no infringement of the Pac-
Man game is Atari, Inc. v. Williams, 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) % 25,412 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28,
1981).
M Atari holds an assignment of the exclusive right to copy Pac-Man in home-video games;
Midway holds similar rights to Pac-Man as a coin operated arcade game. See 2 COPYRIGHT L.
REP. (CCH) 25,363, at 17,045. North America's game K.C. Munchkin was marketed as a
home-video game. See id.
12 Id. (quoting plaintiffs' prayers for relief). This requested relief was eventually entered,
following the court of appeals reversal. See infra text accompanying note 197.
127 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,363, at 17,046.
128 In K.C. Munchkin, there is "variability of mazes," whereas in Pac-Man the maze is
fixed throughout the play. Id.
129 Id. at 17,046-47.
130 Id. The court of appeals terminology was somewhat different. It referred to the central
character in both games as "goblins" and called the other figures in both games "monsters" or
"ghost monsters." See infra text accompanying notes 175-78. The appellate court used its similar-
ity of terminology to support its finding of infringement. See 672 F.2d at 617-18.
131 See 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,363, at 17,046.
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the central character to gobble the dots while at the same time avoiding
the goblins or munchers. 
32
Based on these similarities, the court might have immediately con-
cluded, as the courts did in Stern Electronics and Armenia,133 that Pac-
Man and K.C. Munchkin were "substantially similar." Like the
Amusement World court,'" however, the North American Philips
court also catalogued and analyzed the area of dissimilarity. The maze
in K.C. Munchkin is more rectangular with more horizontal passage-
ways than the maze in Pac-Man. 35 Pac-Man's central character is yel-
low and appears only in profile;136 K.C. Munchkin's is blue with horns
and a smile that, under attack, turns to a frown. He shows himself both
in profile and full-face.137 The four "goblins" in Pac-Man have eyes
and appendages. The "munchers" in K.C. Munchkin "are much
'spookier' than the goblins in Pac-Man," having vacant eyes and more
dramatically animated, longer legs.'3 " K.C. Munchkin munchers are
colored red, green, and yellow, while Pac-Man's are red, blue, tur-
quoise, and orange.'3 9
All of the foregoing differences might be characterized as involving
only the "graphic" aspects of the games. The court also identified dif-
ferences "from the point of view of play of the two games." In Pac-
Man, the goblins move "upward out of a fixed center 'box' into the
maze," while K.C. Munchkin's "first mode of play shows the center of
the maze as a box changing the open side by ninety degrees every two
or three seconds."" 0 There are several hundred stationary dots in Pac-
Man, while K.C. Munchkin has but twelve dots that move. K.C.
Munchkin's dots also accelerate as their brethren are consumed until
the last dot is moving as fast as the central character. As the court put
it, the last dot "cannot be caught by overtaking it; it must be munched
by strategy.""' Another equally fundamental difference is that the
K.C. Munchkin player can "draw on the screen whatever walls he
wishes to cause in the maze, thus creating a continuously changing
maze from game to game.""1
42
'" In Pac-Man, points can also be scored by consuming goblins when they have turned blue.
See id.
153 See supra text accompanying notes 69-84.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 106-23.
13 See 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,363, at 17,046.








On the equities, the district court opinion in North American
Philips is unique among video game cases in the detail with which it
examined the process by which the defendants created and marketed
the accused work. It was admitted that Mr. Ed Averett, the creator of
K.C. Munchkin, had seen and played Pac-Man before completing his
design of K.C. Munchkin.1"' It was further admitted that the defendant
North American had initially attempted to obtain a license for Pac-
Man from the plaintiff Midway and asked Mr. Averett to develop K.C.
Munchkin only after Midway had rebuffed its licensing overtures.
1 44
In anticipation of the plaintiffs' infringement claims, North American
asked Averett to alter the shapes and colors of K.C. Munchkin's central
character and munchers "to get away from even a cosmetic similarity to
the colors in 'Pac-Man.' 1145
North American's and Averett's conduct in creating K.C.
Munchkin, as described in the preceding paragraph, could cut either
way. On the one hand, it was clear that the defendants avoided market-
ing a product identical to Pac-Man. On the other hand, one could ar-
gue that, having failed to secure a license for Pac-Man, North Ameri-
can had tried to market a product as close to Pac-Man as possible, thus
endeavoring to profit from Pac-Man's obvious success without paying a
royality to Pac-Man's owners.1 46 One crucial difference, however, dis-
tinguishes the North American Philips defendants from those in cases
such as Stern Electronics and Dirkschneider. That is the fact that
North American took extraordinary measures to avoid creating the im-
pression that its game and Pac-Man came from the same source. The
court described these measures as follows:
Internal instructions were issued within the company to avoid use
of all trade names, trademarks, or trade definitions of others in
connection with the game promotion. Specifically, instructions
given were for the purpose of avoiding any reference to the "Pac-
Man" game. On October 27 and November 27, 1981, memoranda
143 See id. at 17,048. Mr. Averett had created another maze-chase game, "Take the Money
and Run," before starting work on K.C. Munchkin and presumably before seeing Pac-Man. See
id. at 17,047, 17,050. The district court opinion suggests that some aspects of the earlier game
may have been incorporated into K.C. Munchkin. See infra text accompanying note 158. Without
explanation for its different finding of fact, the Court of Appeals stated, "Mr. Averett also played
PAC-MAN at least once before begining work on K.C. Munchkin." 672 F.2d at 613. The court's
failure to explain the basis on which it reached this differing finding of fact is particularly troub-
ling since the independent creation of K.C. Munchkin's predecessor prior to the creation of Pac-
Man was a fact explicitly relied on by the district court in reaching its noninfringement conclu-
sion. See 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,363, at 17,050. See generally infra text accompanying
note 179.
144 See 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,363, at 17,047.
145 Id. at 17,048.
"' The Seventh Circuit opinion made the latter inference. See 672 F.2d at 619.
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were addressed to its sales force in which North American stressed
that it did not want "others to misapply our game names and
trademarks to their games. Likewise, we should not use other peo-
ple's trademarks or game names to refer to our own games [sic]."
The advertisements used referred to the "K. C. Munchkin" video
game cartridge, its packaging for that cartridge, and the instruction
manual; it did not include any material which could reasonably
result in confusion with "Pac-Man. ' 47
When an independent distributor, "Minnesota Fats, the Video King"
advertised K.C. Munchkin as "a Pac-Man type game," a North Amer-
ican representative rapidly contacted Video King "for the purpose of
attempting to get that company to delete any reference of [sic] 'Pac-
Man' game in any future advertisement.1 148 In sharp contrast, the de-
fendants in Stern Electronics attempted in bad faith to establish a first
use of the work "Scramble" and then called their product "Scramble
2," all in an obvious effort to trade off the goodwill of Stern's "Scram-
ble."' 149 Similarly, the defendants in Dirkschneider had chosen for one
of their infringing games the same name plaintiff used-"Rally
X"-and otherwise infringed Atari's trademarks. 150 In these respects,
the conduct of the defendants in North American Philips compares fa-
vorably with that of the defendants in Stern Electronics and
Dirkschneider, and may have helped to push the court away from a
finding of infringement.
Following such an extensive review of relevant facts, the district
court's analysis of the infringement issue is disappointing and uncon-
vincing. The court acknowledged that "'[c]opying' proscribed by copy-
right law means more than tracing original [sic], line by line; to some
extent it includes appropriation of artist's [sic] thought in creating his
own form of expression."15' This seems to acknowledge the accepted
principle that a work can be "reproduce[d] . . in copies" in violation
of the owner's exclusive rights under section 106(1) of the Act152 if the
infringer makes a "substantially similar" copy. But the court next de-
clares, "[s]ince plaintiffs cannot prove copying, they advance the theory
147 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. 1 25,363, at 17,048. The opinion of the Court of Appeals omitted
these facts entirely. See 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
148 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. 25,363, at 17,049. The court properly observed that "[t]he adver-
tisement by Minnesota Fats referring to 'K.C. Munchkin' as 'a Pac-Man type game' did not
confuse one game with the other." Id. at 17,050. But c. Invicta Plastics (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. Mego
Corp., 523 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (enjoining under the Lanham Act ((Trade-Mark Act of
1946) July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)) even truth-
ful comparisons of the defendant's games with the plaintiff's).
149 See Stern Elecs., 523 F. Supp. at 640-41; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
150 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
151 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,363, at 17,050.
2 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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that 'K.C. Munchkin' is substantially similar to 'Pac-Man.' ",153 This
statement incorrectly suggests that a substantially similar work could
infringe a copyrighted work even if it were proven that the substan-
tially similar work had been created independently of the copyrighted
work.154 The statement also overlooks the principle that "copying may
be inferred where the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and
the accused work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work."'
1 55
Having gotten its copyright analysis off to a bad start, the court
concluded:
But evidence in this record shows that "K.C. Munchkin" is not
substantially similar to "Pac-Man." In fact, it has been established
in the proceeding that [the] defendants created their game from a
source they had utilized before "Pac-Man" came into existence;
the maze defendants utilized is different, and the way their game is
played is different from plaintiffs' "Pac-Man.'
5
The court's conclusion thus repeats the error of its premise. If K.C.
Munchkin was created before Pac-Man came into existence, then no
prior access could be shown and the question of substantial similarity
would be irrelevant. On the other hand, the court's recitation of facts
had stated: "Prior to embarking on the development of his game, Mr.
Averett, in the company of a North American executive, saw a 'Pac-
Man' in an Atlanta, Georgia airport arcade."' 57 In context, this seems
to mean that Averett saw Pac-Man before he started to develop K.C.
Munchkin, but after he had created another maze-chase game called
"Take the Money and Run,' 158 "whose maze configuration is rectan-
gular and almost identical with that in 'K.C. Munchkin.' "'15' Thus,
the plaintiffs had shown access, but only with respect to any parts of
K.C. Munchkin created after Averett saw Pac-Man in the Atlanta
airport.
Besides the court's failure to focus on the issue of access, its one-
sentence analysis of the issue of substantial similarity is wholly inade-
quate. Because Averett had evidently created a maze-chase game, Take
the Money and Run, before seeing Pac-Man, the case raised the issues:
(i) whether some of the similarities between K.C. Munchkin and Pac-
Man were created before Averett had access to Pac-Man; and (ii) if the
153 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) % 25,363, at 17,050.
1" Such a suggestion would directly contradict the principle that copyright infringement,
unlike patent infringement, requires copying. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.01, at 13-3.
155 North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 614.
'" 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,363, at 17,050.
a Id. at 17,048.
' See id. at 17,047.
259 Id.
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answer to (i) is "yes," what relief, if any, should be accorded to the
plaintiffs-should the marketing of K.C. Munchkin in its entirety be
enjoined, or should the injunctive relief be limited to those elements
created after Averett gained access to Pac-Man. The court did not so
much as acknowledge the existence of these issues. Instead, it made a
blanket finding that "evidence in this record shows that 'K.C.
Munchkin' is not substantially similar to 'Pac-Man.' ",o
The plaintiffs promptly appealed the district court's denial of their
motion for a preliminary injunction. Considering the limitations of the
district court's reasoning, it is not surprising that the appeal was suc-
cessful. What is surprising, however, is that the court of appeals' care-
ful exposition of copyright law did not provide the basis for a more
compelling decision on the issue of infringement.
D. The Seventh Circuit Opinion in North American Philips
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in North American Philips is un-
doubtedly the preeminent case to date on the issue of copyright protec-
tion for video games. The court's exposition of the standard principles
of copyright law is thorough and accurate. The court properly begins
by noting that "copying" may be proven by a combination of access and
substantial similarity.161 The court endorses the traditional view that
substantial similarity should be assessed through the eyes of the "ordi-
nary observer," stating, "the test is whether the accused work is so sim-
ilar to the plaintiffis work that an ordinary reasonable person would
conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's pro-
tectible expression by taking material of substance and value." 6 2 The
court states that its analysis should avoid "analytic dissection and ex-
pert testimony, 1 63 focusing instead on the "total concept and feel" of
the copyrighted work.'" Finally, the court observes that, unlike a pat-
ent, copyright protects only the expression of the author's ideas and
therefore "does not extend to games as such," but only to pictorial or
graphic portions of games. 6 5 Thus, the court set for itself the task of
attempting "to distill the protectible forms of expression in PAC-MAN
160 Id. at 17,050.
11 See 672 F.2d at 614. The court did not, however, examine the factual question of the
timing of the defendant's access as carefully as it might have. See infra text accompanying notes
179-84.
1"I Id. at 614. For criticism of the "ordinary observer" test, see infra text accompanying notes
282-302.
185 Id. (quoting Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946)).
184 Id. (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir.
1970)).
.85 Id. at 615 (citing 1. M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.18 [H][3], at 2-212, and Stern Eleca.,
669 F.2d at 856).
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from the game itself."166
To tackle this difficult question, the court employed two basic tools
of copyright analysis. One is Learned Hand's famous "abstractions
test":
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this
series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since oth-
erwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended."' 7
The second is the concept of scenes a faire, meaning "incidents, charac-
ters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least
standard, in the treatment of a given topic."1 68 Scenes a faire do not
enjoy protection, even if they are too particularized to be considered
ideas. One reason for this rule is, as the North American Philips court
suggests, that scenes a faire may be so closely connected with the un-
derlying, unprotected idea that they become indistinguishable from
it."' 0 An additional reason may be that the author of the copyrighted
work does not deserve credit and protection for aspects of his work that
could have been copied from other works, even if he invented them
without copying and even if the defendant actually copied them from
the copyrighted work. Thus, the scenes a faire exception furthers the




*67 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931), quoted in North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 615-16.
'" North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 616 (quoting Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40,
45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
' See id.
110 See infra text accompanying notes 246-49. An additional element in the court's exposition
of copyright law is the proposition that when expression and idea are indistinguishable, only ver-
batim copying will be protected. See North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 616-17. The court uses
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971) as an example of
this principle. Although the Kalpakian case has been cited for this proposition, see, e.g., Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167-68 (9th Cir.
1977), the Kalpakian opinion actually suggests the reverse. In Kalpakian the plaintiff claimed that
the defendant had infringed the design of the plaintiff's copyrighted "jeweled bee pin." The court
held for the defendant, commenting that "[w]hen the 'idea' and its 'expression' are thus insepara-
ble, copying the 'expression' will not be barred, since protecting the 'expression' in such circum-
stances would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner free of the conditions and
limitations imposed by the patent law." 446 F.2d at 742. On the other hand, this dicta may have
exceeded the requirements for the court's holding, since the accused and copyrighted bee-pins were
not identical. See id. at 741. See generally infra text accompanying notes 228-32.
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Using these tools, the court found that many similarities between
Pac-Man and K.C. Munchkin were not protected expression. The
court described the "idea" of Pac-Man in "abstract" terms as follows:
PAC-MAN is a maze-chase game in which the player scores
points by guiding a central figure through various passageways of
a maze and at the same time avoiding collision with certain oppo-
nents or pursuit figures which move independently about the maze.
Under certain conditions, the central figure may temporarily be-
come empowered to chase and overtake the opponents, thereby
scoring bonus points.'71
The court resolved to protect only the "audio component and the con-
crete details of the visual presentation [that] constitute the copyrightable
expression of that game 'idea.' "72 The court also identified certain
"standard game devices" as unprotected scenes a faire. These included
a "wrap around" feature, 73 the use of a maze, a scoring table, and dots
that provide "a means by which a player's performance can be gauged
and rewarded .... "17
Having carved out an unprotected domain of ideas and scenes a
faire, the couri nevertheless found infringement on the basis of K.C.
Munchkin's "substantial appropriation of the PAC-MAN charac-
ters."' 5 This appropriation was found to inhere in each game's use of
"goblins" and "ghost monsters," and in the "portrayal" of those char-
acters including their styles, movements and qualities such as "role re-
versal" and "regeneration." ' The court brushed aside the differences
between the games, particularly the concept of moving dots, the varia-
tion in mazes, and certain changes in "facial features and colors of the
characters, '17 7 reasoning that the ordinary observer test requires a
court to focus on "the overall similarity rather than minute differ-
ences," that "the nature of the alteration . . . only tends to emphasize
the extent to which [the defendant] deliberately copied from the plain-
tiff's work," and that the "undiscriminating" audience for video games
"would be disposed to overlook" minor differences in detail, since the
"main attraction of a game such as PAC-MAN lies in the stimulation
provided by the intensity of the competition."' 78
.. North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 617.
172 Id.
17* Id. The "wrap around" feature is a method of operation by which the gobbler can exit
via a "tunnel" at one side of the video screen and re-appear on the opposite side of the screen.
274 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 618.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 618-19. The court further supported its finding that the plaintiff was likely to
succeed on the merits on the ground that retailers and clerks-"lay observers"-had described
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Taken by itself, the court of appeals opinion is convincing and
generally consistent with the policies of the Copyright Act. On close
examination, however, one finds that the court's legal analysis goes
smoothly only because the court suppressed untidy facts. The appellate
court's violence with the facts is most evident on the issue of access. On
this issue, which had also stymied the district court, the court of ap-
peals declared that "[after] view[ing] Pac-Man in an airport arcade
[and] after discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the PAC-MAN
game and its increasing popularity, [Mr. Averett and a North Ameri-
can Philips representative] decided to commence development of a mod-
ified version .... I' The court further said, "Mr. Averett also
played PAC-MAN at least once before beginning work on K.C.
Munchkin. '"'8 On these same issues, the district court had said, "[o]n
at least one occasion before completing his design, [Mr. Averett] played
a 'Pac-Man,' "181 and in its conclusion said, "it has been established in
this proceeding that defendants created their game from a source they
had utilized before 'Pac-Man' came into existence .... ."I" As al-
ready noted, if the game Take the Money and Run was created before
Mr. Averett had access to Pac-Man, then the plaintiffs had failed to
prove prior access with respect to any features of K.C. Munchkin that
were included in Take the Money and Run. Unlike the question of
substantial similarity, for which the court of appeals may be "in as
good a position as the district court to decide," '183 the question of the
time of Averett's access is an issue of fact on which the district' court
may be reversed only if clearly erroneous."" Incredibly, the court of
appeals gave no explanation whatsoever for its statements of fact which
contradicted the findings of the lower court on the central issue of the
time of Averett's access to Pac-Man.
In another part of its opinion, the court of appeals remarked that
"[t]he parties stipulated . . . to access."' 83 The parties had filed a
K.C. Munchkin as a "Pac-Man type game." Id. at 619; see also supra note 148 and accompany-
ing text.
179 North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 613.
280 Id.
181 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,363, at 17,048.
182 Id. at 17,050.
183 North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 614.
184 See Menominee Rubber Co. v. Gould, Inc., 657 F.2d 164, 166 (7th Cir. 1981), cited in
North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 613. It is ironic that only ten months prior to its North
American Philips decision, the Seventh Circuit had made it a point to hold that a preliminary
injunction should not be issued without an evidentiary hearing to test the credibility of the plain-
tiff's witnesses. See Swiderek v. Medeco Security Locks, Inc., 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH)
1 25,402 (7th Cir. May 26, 1981).
188 North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 614. The text of the stipulation provided:
1. Validity of the copyright-in-suit is not contested for the purposes of this hearing.
2. The audio-visual work covered by the copyright-in-suit is a series of images
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three-page stipulation with the district court in connection with Atari's
motion for a preliminary injunction. Contrary to the appellate panel's
implication, the stipulation did not expressly state that the defendants
had "access" for copyright purposes. Instead, the stipulation recited a
sequence of facts related to access. Taken together, and out of the con-
text of the lower court's findings about Take the Money and Run, the
sequence might have provided the basis for inferring access. However,
drawing such an inference seems inappropriate when, as in this case,
the lower court based its finding-that some of K.C. Munchkin was
created before Averett's exposure to Pac-Man-on approximately two
days of testimony during which both the plaintiff and the defendant
presented several witnesses.18 At the very least, this suggests that the
court of appeals should have remanded the case to determine whether
the stipulation should not have been withdrawn in light of the district
court's findings, or whether, on the other hand, the district court's find-
ings should be revised in light of the stipulation.
18 7
On the question of the similarity between the two games, the com-
parison between the appellate and lower court's opinions is equally un-
settling. The district court observed distinctive dissimilarities between
the games' characters. The colors were different; K.C. Munchkin's
monsters were "spookier," and the central figure in K.C. Munchkin
was more developed as a character, showing frowns and smiles. 88
None of these distinctions impressed the appellate panel, which be-
which appear on the television screen of Midway's Pac-Man coin-operated video
game and associated sounds.
3. The person at North American who was principally responsible for the design of
the K.C. Munchkin game at issue here and the person in charge of home video
product development for North American saw a Midway Pac-Man coin-operated
video game at an airport in New York City in February, 1981. These persons have
reported that they do not recall playing the Pac-Man game at that time.
4. The K.C. Munchkin game was designed thereafter, in Spring and Summer,
1981.
5. Before coming out with their K.C. Munchkin game, North American approached
plaintiff Midway and inquired whether a license under the Pac-Man copyright for
the home video market could be obtained.
6. Midway responded to North American that exclusive home video rights under
the Pac-Man copyright had already been licensed to Atari, and therefore could not
be licensed by Midway to North American.
7. The introduction of the K.C. Munchkin game was a careful, conscious decision
by North American.
8. North American plans to ship quantities of the "K.C. Munchkin" game to dis-
tributors and dealers over the next six months.
'" This fact is based on the author's conversations with counsel for both parties to the North
American Philips litigation.
'"' There is certainly a lesson to be learned here on the deleterious effect that stipulated facts
can sometimes have on judicial performance. Presumably, the court of appeals was entitled to rely
on facts stipulated by the parties. On the other hand, it is extraordinary to ignore the detailed
findings of a judge who sat through two days of testimony.
' See supra text accompanying notes 135-39.
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lieved (without adducing any proof) that the audience for video games
"is fairly undiscriminating insofar as their concern about more subtle
differences in artistic expression."189 The court of appeals also assumed
(again without proof) that "[t]he main attraction of a game such as
PAC-MAN lies in the stimulation provided by the intensity of the com-
petition."190 If true, this assertion should have led to the conclusion that
the significant differences in the way the games played would favor a
finding that the games were not substantially similar. But the court of
appeals instead held that similarities in "expression" are more signifi-
cant from a copyright standpoint than are dissimilarities in play."91 In
all, one is left with the distinct impression that the court's finding of
substantial similarity was based entirely on the court's uncritical im-
pression of the similarities between the games. The court's conclusion
of infringement thus seems to have been uninfluenced by its sophisti-
cated copyright analysis based on the idea/expression distinction and
the concept of scenes a faire.192
The appellate court's simplified and stylized version of the facts
allowed it to push aside the really difficult aspect of the K.C.
Munchkin/Pac-Man case: K.C. Munchkin, although superficially sim-
ilar to Pac-Man, was in some respects a different game, created in part
before its creator had ever seen Pac-Man. For this reason, Learned
Hand's "abstraction" continuum did not apply-the amount of similar-
ity between the games did not increase uniformly as the level of ab-
straction increased. At a highly abstract level, K.C. Munchkin and Pac-
Man were similar: both were maze-chase games in which the player
scores points by consuming dots and avoiding monsters. At a middle
level, they were dissimilar-K.C. Munchkin had variable, program-
mable mazes, moving dots, and more need for "strategy." At a superfi-
cial level they were again similar-according to the court of appeals, at
least, the characters looked the same in each game. The court was not
oblivious to the presence of this problem. It acknowledged that "[t]he
defendants and the district court order stress that K.C. Munchkin plays
differently because of the moving dots and the variety of maze configu-
rations from which the player can choose." 9' The court dismissed this
unsettling fact, however, in a blizzard of rhetoric. It declared that the
'" North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 619.
190 Id.
191 See id.
192 The court of appeals should not be faulted too harshly for this impressionistic approach,
since it is consistent with a traditional ("ordinary observer") style of decision in copyright cases.
The "ordinary observer" test employed by the court has the most august credentials, see infra text
accompanying notes 282-87, but is subject to serious shortcomings, see infra text accompanying
notes 298-302.
1"3 North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 619.
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"focus" of a copyright action is on "similarities in protectible expres-
sion"; that "no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much
of his work he did not pirate"; and that "[it is irrelevant that K.C.
Munchkin has other game modes which employ various maze configu-
rations," because "[t]he only mode that concerns this court is the one
that uses a display most similar to the one in PAC-MAN."194 The
court's tone in addressing the most substantial issue it faced thus had
the sound of the prosecutor's summary in a murder trial. K.C.
Munchkin was not merely the accused work, and North American
Philips not merely the defendant in a civil proceeding brought by a
multi-million dollar corporation: the defendant was a plagiarist and all
aspects of K.C. Munchkin should be disregarded except those tending
to prove its resemblance to Pac-Man.
Based on its sanitized reading of the facts, the court of appeals was
able to direct the district court to enter an equally sterile preliminary
injunction "against continued infringement of plaintiffs' copyright." 95
In the context of the court of appeals' opinion, this command required
the defendant to be "enjoined from marketing K.C. Munchkin,"' 6 and
on March 5, 1982, the district court entered an order enjoining and
restraining the defendants "from advertising, distributing, displaying,
performing, selling or offering for sale a video game cartridge known as
'K.C. Munchkin', or in any other manner violating plaintiffs' exclusive
rights under the copyright in the Pac-Man audiovisual work.11 9 7 The
Seventh Circuit panel declared pridefully that the injunction would
"preserve the integrity of the copyright laws which seek to encourage
individual effort and creativity by granting valuable enforceable
rights."1 ' The court awarded itself this ovation without pausing to
measure the impact of its injunction on the effort and creativity of per-
sons who, like Mr. Averett, create maze-chase games that will compete
with, and possibly improve upon, Pac-Man. Pac-Man had sales of
$150 million between October of 1980 and December 1981,99 and
K.C. Munchkin had been in production for that entire period of
"' Id. Why this should be irrelevant is diffcuh to understand. At least, it suggests that only
the similar game features should be enjoined, not that K.C. Munchkin is as a whole infringing.
195 Id. at 621.
19 Id. at 620.
197 See the district court's order on remand, Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer
Elecs. Corp., No. 81 C 6434 (N.D. Ill. March 5, 1982), reprinted in North American Philips
Consumer Elecs. Corp., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit app. E, at El, Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672
F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982).
. North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 620.
19 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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time-since August of 1980.200 Under these circumstances, it is fictional
for the appellate court to have concluded that the effort and creativity
of the makers of Pac-Man would not be rewarded and the "integrity of
the copyright laws" would be lost, unless K.C. Munchkin was en-
joined. The court's injunction may have protected the size of Pac-Man
profits, but it surely was not necessary for their existence.
One can only surmise that the court's rhetorical flourishes served
to assuage discomfort over its artificially uncomplicated holding. That
holding was required by two assumptions: first, that K.C. Munchkin as
a whole either infringed Pac-Man or did not, and second, that the
plaintiff's rights in Pac-Man could only be protected by copyright. As
will be discussed at length later in this Article, neither of these assump-
tions is valid.20' As one alternative, the court could have found that
only certain aspects of K.C. Munchkin infringed Pac-Man. The court
of appeals based its finding of infringement primarily on the similari-
ties between the Pac-Man and K.C. Munchkin "characters. 20 2 It has
sometimes been held that one may claim copyright infringement in the
unauthorized copying of a character, even if in the accused work the
character participates in a wholly different plot.20 3 The typical remedy
for "character infringment" is to enjoin the infringer's use of the in-
fringing characters, while leaving the defendants free to employ differ-
ent characters in the service of the same or a similar plot. Thus, a
finding that K.C. Munchkin's characters were "substantially similar"
to Pac-Man's and therefore infringing would have required the defen-
dants to change the appearance of K.C. Munchkin's "muncher" and
"monsters," while preserving for public enjoyment K.C. Munchkin's
programmable mazes, moving dots, and other unique features.
A problem in the character infringement approach is that the
character must be "sufficiently developed to command copyright protec-
tion."'2 4 One might question whether the stylized, geometrical figures
that constitute Pac-Man's characters meet this criterion. Even if they
200 See North American Philips, 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,363, at 17,048.
201 See infra text t'ollowing note 263.
02 The court said, "it is the substantial appropriation of the PAC-MAN characters that
requires reversal of the district court." North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 617.
202 See, e.g., Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1970);
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1939); Warner Bros., Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 530 F. Supp. 1187, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); United Artists Corp. v.
Ford Motor Co., 483 F. Supp. 89, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.12, at
2-169. Kaplan has questioned the possibility of character infringement in its entirety, arguing that
"literary characters, in plays as in novels, achieve their distinctness in large part by being made to
react to the particular flux of incident in the particular milieu." B. KALPAN, supra note 10, at 51.
He leaves the door open for infringement "as between pictorial characters," id., but even there
warns of "trouble in setting proper bounds to their protection." Id. at 52.
204 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.12, at 2-171.
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do not, however, there is a second alternative to the appellate court's
blanket finding of copyright infringement. If one accepts the district
court's conclusion that K.C. Munchkin and Pac-Man were significantly
different maze-chase games (so that Hand's continuum of abstractions
does not apply), and if one further believes that the Pac-Man "charac-
ters" are too rudimentary to qualify for copyright protection, then the
superficial similarities between the otherwise differing games suggest
that the defendant's real offense may have been more in the nature of
trademark infringement and unfair competition than in the nature of
copyright infringement." 5 Indeed, Pac-Man's central "gobbler" charac-
ter has become a recognized symbol apparently having great value206
independent of its function in the game itself. Assuming that the plain-
tiffs in North American Philips could show that they began using the
distinctive features of the Pac-Man characters before the defendant be-
gan to market K.C. Munchkin, a confusing similarity in appearance
between K.C. Munchkin's characters and Pac-Man's could provide a
basis for relief both at common law,207 under state statutes,20 8 and
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.2" 9 Such relief could prevent
205 See Lanham Act § 43; 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1976). At least one court has suggested that the
criteria for trademark infringement may be the same as those for "substantial similarity" under
the Copyright Act. See Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 530 F. Supp. 1187,
1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). This equivalance may be true for the trademark issue of "confusing simi-
larity" and the copyright issue of "substantial similarity." As discussed in the text, however, the
policies of trademark protection are different from those of copyright protection. For this reason, a
geometrical form such as Pac-Man's central character (a circle with a v-shaped notch cut in it)
might be too simple to enjoy protection as a "character" protected by copyright but may neverthe-
less be a "strong" trademark (analagous to such well-known marks as the McDonald arches, the
Shell Oil Company shell, and the CBS "eye") because its very simplicity gives it distinctiveness
and a propensity for immediate recognition. Strength of a mark refers to "its tendency to identify
the goods sold under the mark as emanating from a particular . . . source." MeGregor-Doniger,
Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979). Thus, if the threshold criteria of confus-
ing substantial similarity is met by two figures, trademark law may protect them as "marks" while
copyright law would not protect them as "characters." It has been expressly held that "ingredi-
ents" of products which are sold as entertainment, such as the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders'
uniform, the Star Wars characters, and comic book characters such as "Aquaman" may be pro-
tected under § 43(c) of the Lanham Act. See D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Associates, 486 F.
Supp. 1273, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). For an example of a court finding trademark infringement in
the appropriation of video game characters, see Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp.
466 (D. Neb. 1981) (discussed supra text following note 85).
z5" Judging from the frequency and breadth of its use, its value is clear. There is, for exam-
ple, a Pac-Man cartoon series, and the author recently discovered that there is even a Pac-Man ice
cream bar. The bar is in the shape of the Pac-Man gobbler, and its shape and name are duly
licensed to the ice cream manufacturer by Midway Manufacturing Corp., one of the plaintiffs in
North American Philips.
207 See R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
§ 2.01 (4th ed. 1981). Note that the action could lie regardless of whether the plaintiffs had
registered the character as trademark. See id. at § 2.01 n.2.
"I See, e.g., 1964 Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act § 2, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 ,
§ 312 (Supp. 1982) (claimed by Atari to have been violated by the North American Philips
defendants).
209 Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1976), is generally considered to be a
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North American Philips from unfairly appropriating to its own advan-
tage the good will associated with the famous Pac-Man "characters"
while at the same time allowing the distribution of a maze-chase game
having K.C. Munchkin's unique playing features. Had the court of ap-
peals focused on these considerations, its interpretation of the facts in
its North American Philips opinion might have been less strained and
its conclusion more convincing and just.
III. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVED COPYRIGHT ANALYSIS
All of the opinions described above were rendered during the years
1981 and 1982.2"' During that brief span the courts swung sharply
between overbroad and overnarrow scope of protection for the games.
In some early opinions (Stern Electronics district court opinion, Arme-
nia, Artic International, and Dirkschneider) courts granted sweeping
relief to the copyright claimants, often paying little or no attention to
the traditional limitations on copyright protection for games. In other
opinions (Amusement World, and the North American Philips district
court opinion) the older dogmas that copyright does not protect "ideas"
and "games" were reasserted so strongly that the courts found nonin-
fringement in the face of surprisingly numerous and specific points of
identity between the copyrighted and allegedly infringing games. In still
other cases (Stern Electronics and North American Philips court of ap-
peals opinions), the courts appeared to overextend copyright law to
remedy trademark infringement. None of these opinions presents a con-
vincing balancing of the interests protected by copyright law.
In several video game cases, the courts' holdings on the issue of
infringement were by no means foregone conclusions. North American
Philips is perhaps the best example, because in a detailed opinion the
district court had found Pac-Man and K.C. Munchkin not substan-
tially similar, only to have its finding on this issue of fact reversed by
the court of appeals. Likewise, the points of similarity between the
plaintiff's and defendant's games in Amusement World were so exten-
sive that a reasonable person might easily have concluded that the de-
fendant's game had infringed the plaintiff's, although the court, in a
scholarly opinion, held otherwise. Despite the differing conclusions that
grab-bag for types of unfair competition that may not fall into a recognized category of trademark
infringement. See, e.g., Berlitz School of Languages of America, Inc. v. Everest House, 619 F.2d
211 (2d Cir. 1980); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
2'0 Two more recent video game copyright decisions, Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l. Inc.,
685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982), and Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125
(D.N.J. 1982) were rendered while this Article was being edited, and are referred to in several
footnotes.
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could reasonably be reached from the facts both in North American
Philips and in Amusement World, the outcome in both cases was a
complete victory for one party over the other, like a verdict of guilty or
not guilty.
It has already been remarked that the peculiar characteristics of
video games could be expected to place great pressure on the established
copyright dogmas that a distinction may be drawn betwen ideas and
expressions, and that ideas, and more particularly games, should not
enjoy copyright protection. The considerable variations of outcomes in
the video game cases reflect the courts' efforts to respond to this pres-
sure, sometimes giving in to the claims for protection too quickly, and
at other times failing adequately to acknowledge them. Some back-and-
forth movement of this kind is inevitable whenever the law seeks to
mold itself to a new environment. It is the thesis of this Article, how-
ever, that the swings of precedent in the early video game cases have
been too wide. Their breadth, it is submitted, is the direct result of
several largely unrecognized, but nevertheless pervasive habits of copy-
right adjudication, all of which incline the courts to grant or deny relief
on an all-or-nothing basis. The following sections of the Article will
describe how these habits have become pitfalls to the elaboration of
copyright law in new settings such as video games. Suggestions for
avoiding these pitfalls will also be made.
A. Ideas and Expressions"1
In video game cases such as the appellate court decisions in Stern
Electronics and North American Philips, the courts' application of cop-
yright law resulted in overbroad protection for the video games. The
principle that is supposed to stand as a bulwark against such overbroad
protection is that copyright does not protect "ideas." Unfortunately, the
courts' employment of this concept in the video game cases has been
inhibited in two ways, both of which make the idea/expression distinc-
tion at best a stilted instrument of policy. The first is that the courts
have generally excluded or overlooked evidence extrinsic to the accused
and copyrighted games that might have helped them decide what forms
of taking may be called the taking of "ideas." The second is that the
courts have assumed that anything one might call a "rule of play" is an
"idea" and therefore outside the scope of copyright protection. To these
errors we will now turn.
" For a general discussion of the application of the idea/expression distinction to video
games, see Jones, supra note 7, at 35-43.
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1. The Idea/Expression Distinction, Scenes a Faire, and a Sense of
Context
a. Copyright Policy Considerations
As has already been observed, the central problem of copyright
law is to reconcile and balance interests in, on the one hand, rewarding
individuals for their "unique creative efforts," '212 and, on the other
hand, making authors' "ideas freely accessible to the public so that they
may be used for the intellectual advancement of mankind,"'2 13 thus pro-
moting "the Progress of Science and useful Arts."2"" Some might ques-
tion the contribution of video games to the intellectual advancement of
mankind, but copyright protection is blind to such normative considera-
tions,2 15 and one of the most impressive aspects of the video game phe-
nomenon is the burst of creativity this new medium has fostered. To
inhibit such vigorous creative activity by threatening each variation and
improvement of an initial work with costly infringement liability would
be wholly inconsistent with the Copyright Act policy of promoting di-
versity and advancement. To expose video game authors to uncontrolled
expropriation of the fruits of their labors by the marketing of knock-off
games would be equally inconsistent with the Copyright Act policy of
rewarding creative efforts.
The idea/expression distinction aspires to resolve, or at least to
stand as a proxy for, these competing policy considerations. Copyright
protects expression (thus rewarding authors) while thrusting ideas into
the public domain (thus promoting science and the useful arts). Histor-
ically, the public domain encompassed far more territory than that
bounded by the modern concept of the copyright "idea."21 The first
genuine copyright legislation (following overthrow of the Stationers'
Company's monopoly) was the Statute of Anne,2 17 enacted in 1709,
which accorded to an author and his assigns "the sole liberty of print-
512 Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) T 25,337, at 16,890
(N.D. II. June 2, 1981).
213 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03[A], at 13-19; see L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND
FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 3-17 (1978).
214 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Becker v. Loew's, Inc., 113 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1943);
Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03[A], at 13-
18; supra note 9.
211 See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) (holding, inter alia, that obscene content is not a bar to
copyrightability).
2" This synopsis of copyright history is based on the account in B. Kaplan, supra note 10, at
1-38.
217 An act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the
author's [sic] or purchasers of such copies, during the times therein mentioned, 1709, 8 Anne, ch.
19.
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ing and reprinting" a book.218 In a series of cases decided between 1720
and 1785, the English courts held that translations, abridgements, and
improved editions of informational works such as maps, histories, and
dictionaries (all certainly "derivative" works in the modern sense)2 9
did not infringe the earlier, copyrighted works on which they were
based.22 Justice Kaplan proposes two principles on which these cases
may have been based. First, the courts would hold against infringement
if the defendant had added to or improved upon the original work. In
the case of an abridgement of Hawkesworth's Voyages, the defendant
"was not only exculpated but congratulated for reducing Hawkesworth
and preserving the substance in different language perhaps better than
the original. ' 221 Second, the courts would hold against infringement if
they found that the defendant's work did not "interfere unduly with the
normal economic exploitation of the copyright." '222 Whatever the ra-
tionale, the effect of such cases was to restrict copyright infringement
essentially to verbatim copying of the entire original work.
Nineteenth century decisions in England and in the United States
preserved the rules that permitted translations and abridgements. How-
ever, the dike separating actionable verbatim copying from all other
forms of taking suffered a steady erosion under the influence of expan-
sive copyright legislation,223 judicial elaboration of the concept of "sub-
stantial" taking,224 and scholarly criticism of the early limitations on
copyright protection. 225 The modern exception to liability for the taking
of "ideas" appears to have emerged as a fall-back levee against the
flood of unlimited protection which otherwise would have ensued once
a remedy for nonverbatim copying was recognized.
Reflecting these developments, our present Copyright Act reverses
the historical presumption favoring all but verbatim copying. Section
102(b) of the Act extends protection to all aspects of an "original work
of authorship" except "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
218 Id. § 1.
219 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981) (definition of a "derivative work").
22 See B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 9-17.
221 Id. at 12.
121 Id. at 17. This consideration has survived as one of the criteria for fair use in the Copy-
right Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
222 For example, an English statute on engravings prohibited copying "in whole or in part,
by varying, adding to, or diminishing from the main design," B. KAPLAN, supra note 10 at 20
(quoting from 8 Geo. 2, ch. 13 § 1 (1735), and the 1870 amendment to the United States copy-
right laws extended protection to translations and dramatizations of copyrighted works. See Act of
July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §86, 16 Stat. 186, 212 (discussed in B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 32).
224 See B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 20.
225 See Justice Kaplan's comments on Justice Storey, B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 28-29.
See generally Kaplan's remarks on the reflection in the law of the cultural transformation from
classical virtues (which emphasized the importance of imitation) to the romantic ideal (emphasiz-
ing new creation and individuality), id. at 22-25.
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operation, concept, principle, or discovery" that is "described, ex-
plained, illustrated or embodied" in the work.22 Thus, the logic of the
Copyright Act is like a Venn diagram in which the "universe" includes
all aspects of the work. Copyright protection extends to the whole uni-
verse except for the area within the universe carved out by the phrase
"any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle or discovery." Where, as in the case of video games, ideas are
not easily distinguished from their expressions, the difficulty of identify-
ing ideas combined with the logic of the Copyright Act (universal pro-
tection, except for ideas) foretells an area of protection that may expand
beyond the bounds set by copyright policy.22
For convenience, courts typically use the word "idea" as a short-
hand for the longer list in section 102(a).2 " Like any English word
drafted into the service of the law, the word "idea" has acquired a
special copyright meaning. It is a relatively narrow meaning, the con-
tours of which can be perceived in certain axioms of copyright protec-
tion. One such axiom is that, with rare exceptions,229 the verbatim cop-
ying of an entire work constitutes infringement of the work.
23 0 Of
necessity, a verbatim copy incorporates each and every "idea" in the
original work, and punishing the verbatim copier therefore punishes
one form of copying of ideas. It is assumed, however, that an "idea" for
copyright purposes is capable of expression in a way different from the
way it was expressed in the original work. This assumption is by no
means obvious,2 3 but it forms the basis for reasoning that one may
226 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For the designs of "useful articles" which
also fall within the definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works," the Act conditions
operation of this presumption on satisfaction of the requirement that the pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural features of such works be "identified separately from, and ... capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(definition of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works). However, all courts have characterized
video games as audiovisual works, to which the limitation expressed in § 101 for copyright in
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works which are also "useful articles" probably does not apply.
27 This has been true in the video game cases despite the traditional rule that when ideas
and expressions cannot be distinguished, copyright protects only against vebatim copying. See
supra note 170.
228 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
228 One exception is the verbatim copying of blank forms. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c) (1982);
see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) ("The conclusion to which we have come is,
that blank account-books are not the subject of copyright . . ... "). However, even this exception
has been questioned. See I M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.18[C]. Another exception may be the
verbatim copying of a very elementary idea. See supra note 170 (jeweled bee pin).
2I See North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 614 n.6, 616 (implying that review is not re-
quired when copying is verbatim); supra note 170.
221 Reverting to the ordinary meaning of "idea," one might question, for example, whether
the "idea" of "To be or not to be" is capable of expression in different words. Could any para-
phrase (e.g., "I can't decide whether to act or to remain passive") express the same idea? Cf
Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967) (holding that a rule
which has a limited number of forms of expression is not copyrightable); Sid & Marty Krofft
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penalize the verbatim copier without unlawfully extending protection to
the ideas in the original work.
A second axiom is that a work which is not a verbatim copy, but
which is "substantially similar" to the original work, may also be an
infringement. To be "substantially similar" to the original work, the
infringing work must express the same things as the original work, al-
beit with different words, sounds, or images. The recognition that a
"substantially similar" work may infringe the original therefore implies
that capability of expression in more than one way is a necessary, but
not a sufficient condition for qualification as an "idea" for copyright
purposes. To qualify as an idea, what has been expressed differently in
the original and in the substantially similar work must also attain a
minimum level of generality. This principle forms the basis for
Learned Hand's famous "abstractions test."
'23 2
Combined, the logic of the Copyright Act (universal protection,
except for ideas) and the narrow meaning of the copyright "idea" carry
an important implication. If it is difficult to identify the ideas embodied
in the copyrighted work, or if one cannot effectively separate the ideas
from the expression, then the "ideas" exception becomes a null set and
copyright protection expands to include all aspects of the copyrighted
work. In such circumstances, the idea/expression distinction, histori-
cally the next line of defense against overbroad protection once copy-
right actions for nonverbatim copying had been recognized, and the
modern embodiment of the public policy favoring use and exploitation
of copyrighted works, fails its purpose. This is exactly what seems to
have happened in video game cases, particularly Stern Electronics (dis-
trict court), Armenia, and Artic International, in which the courts did
not even attempt to separate the games' ideas from their expressions
and, as a result, granted the plaintiffs sweeping equitable relief. The
task of separating ideas from expressions is particularly difficult with
regard to video games, in which the rules of play are often imbedded in,
and are in some ways indistinguishable from, the games' graphics.
2 33
The results in cases such as Stern Electronics, Armenia, and Artic, are
thus the predictable sum of adding the nature of the games to the logic
of the Copyright Act.
Video game cases are not the only types of cases in which ideas are
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). See generally B.
KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 45-56 (questioning idea/expression analysis as applied, for example, to
the fine arts).
S2 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
23 It will be recalled that this is one of the differences between video games and the leading
cases establishihg the blackletter rule that copyright does not protect games. See supra notes 45-47
and accompanying text.
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so difficult to separate from their expression that the distinction seems
unhelpful as an arbiter of copyright policy. For graphic works such as
paintings and sculptures the distinction is especially inept; it is perhaps
in recognition of this that Congress reversed the Act's logic for "picto-
rial, graphic, and sculptural works," granting their expression protec-
tion only if "capable of existing independently of" the "utilitarian" as-
pects of the work.2 34 Justice Kaplan has argued persuasively that the
identification of "ideas" in musical works, particularly modern works
lacking in melody, is equally futile.2"5 Arguably, it would be better to
do without the distinction altogether. 3 Considering that the Copyright
Act is only six years old, and considering that there had been calls for a
revision of copyright law for more than thirty years before its pas-
sage,237 the thought of discarding the idea/expression distinction en-
tirely must be considered a utopian dream at best. For the time being,
we are stuck with the Act's use of the idea/expression dichotomy to
modulate the scope of copyright protection, and we will have to make
the best of it. Fortunately, the Act's list of idea-like elements is not one
of these legal bugs encased in the amber of a statute.2 8 The Act leaves
2- 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see also B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 54-56.
'S" See B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 53.
'36 Perhaps a better approach would recognize that no single formulation can hope to strike
the policy balance across the whole range of "works" by which humans reach out to each other
through their senses, and would instead substitute a set of factors, shifting in importance as one
moves from one type of work to another. Such factors would probably include the nature and
substantiality of the taking, the purpose of the taking, and the impact of the taking on the market
for the copyrighted work. These are similar to the Act's criteria for fair use, located in § 107:
In determining whether the use made of such a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For historical examples of the consideration of such
factors, see B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 11-21, discussing Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035,
1038-39 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728) (Story, J.) (considering importance of part taken); Wil-
kins v. Aikin, 34 Eng. Rep. 163 (Ch. 1810) (discussing relevance of borrower's profit motive);
Dodsley v. Kinnersley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch. 1761) (discussing effect of infringing work on sales
of copyrighted work). For limited borrowings which exceed the policy limits, the ideal act we are
imagining might sanction the grant of royalties to the copyright holder as a less restrictive alterna-
tive to injunctive relief. In effect, the concept of substantial similarity would be subsumed into the
doctrine of fair use.
27 Revisions of the Copyright Act of 1909 were under serious discussion at least since the
1940's. See, e.g., Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright (pts. 1 & 2), 45 COLUM. L. REV.
503, 719 (1945).
'" Contrast § 117 of the Act, as originally passed, which attempted to freeze the law of
computer uses of copyrighted works at its 1977 state of development.
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 through 116 and 118, this title does
not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights with
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plenty of room for development of the idea of an "idea"; by framing
discussion in terms of "ideas" and "expressions," the court's freedom of
consideration is restricted, but not entirely lost.
One must, then, find ways to make ideas and expressions effectu-
ate the desired policy even in those cases, like video game cases, in
which they are not ideal intellectual tools. A careful examination of the
way courts have used these tools in more traditional cases can provide
some insight - both in showing techniques that may work for the
more unusual cases and in showing why some standard techniques will
not work.
b. Scenes a faire
One of the most important tools used to strike the policy balance
in traditional cases is the concept of scenes a faire. Using this device,
courts inquire whether the copyrighted and allegedly infringing works
are more similar to each other than they are to other works of the same
genre. In a traditional case, such as the alleged infringement of a novel,
courts dig into their own knowledge and experience to provide the nec-
essary information about other works. O'Neill v. Dell Publishing Co.,
Inc.2 39 is a good example. In O'Neill, the plaintiff claimed that his
unpublished manuscript "Return to Nowhere" had been infringed by
the defendant's published book Ghost Boat. Both novels used the device
of a submarine that mysteriously disappears, only to reappear at a
much later time. The court immediately placed this theme in a literary
context familiar both to the court and (presumably) to anyone reading
the opinion:
As the district court noted, Return to Nowhere uses the Rip Van
Winkle theme of a sleep that lasts for years. Instead of taking place
in the Catskill Mountains and being induced by strong drink quaf-
fed during a game of "bowls" with little men, the sleep in Return
To Nowhere takes place off the coast of Alaska when a submarine
with its entire crew is trapped under a massive ice formation. Un-
respect to the use of the work in conjunction with automatic systems capable of
storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring information, or in conjunction with
any similar device, machine, or process, than those afforded to works under the law,
whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31,
1977, as held applicable and construed by a court in an action brought under this
title.
Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, tit. I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2565 (1976) (current
version at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
"1' 630 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1980). For another example, see Warner Bros., Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 530 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that the television show The
Greatest American Hero does not infringe "Superman" based in part on comparison of those
works with other works of the superhero genre).
COPYRIGHT
like old Rip, however, the submariners do not age as the years
pass. When awakened from their frozen state, they are the same
age as when the submarine dove under the ice pack on one Christ-
mas Eve, 1942, to avoid Japanese destroyers.
2 40
By drawing an analogy to the story of Rip Van Winkle, the court
showed that the idea of a character who disappears and mysteriously
returns at a later time was already in the public domain and not availa-
ble for copyright protection. After summarizing the plot of each book in
some detail, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment
for the defendant, holding that the similarities between the two works
were only on the level of unprotected ideas. 41
A similar use of context appears in a more recent decision,
Warner Brothers, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,242 in which the
court held that the television series The Greatest American Hero had
not infringed copyright in the "Superman" comic books, television se-
ries, and movies. In that case, the central characters in the accused and
infringing works shared many features: "Super-strength," "Super-
hearing," "Super-vision," "Super-speed," "Super-breath," "Invulnera-
bility," "The ability to Fly," an "Alter-ego," and a "Costume.
'2 43
However, the court reviewed generally the literature of "super heroes,"
finding that many of them also had capes, tightfitting uniforms, role
reversals, and so on. At most, the hero in The Greatest American Hero
was only marginally more similar to Superman than it was to the other
works of the super-hero genre. The court therefore found for the
defendant.
Courts often equate scenes a faire with the "idea" of the copy-
righted and accused works.244 This equation is an instance of legal
fiction, or at least legal exaggeration. For example, the cape typically
worn by comic book superheroes has no discernable intrinsic connection
with the idea of a creature having extraordinary powers. (By contrast,
bulging muscles and a trim physique might claim such a connection.)
The cape is more fairly described as a literary convention or device that
probably has an historical rather than a logical explanation. Clearly,
scenes a faire and ideas are often not synonymous, and thus recitation
of the principle that ideas are not protected does not adequately explain
denial of protection to scenes a faire. More plausible alternative expla-
210 O'Neill, 630 F.2d at 687.
241 See id. at 690.
"' 530 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). An additional factor supporting the court's finding
of noninfringement is that the Hero series parodies Superman. As Kaplan has noted, parody often
requires a high degree of similarity to be effective. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 69.
243 Warner Bros., 530 F. Supp. at 1190-92.
244 See, e.g., North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 616.
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nations come to mind. One is that the standard assumption that access
plus substantial similarity implies copying does not obtain when the
substantial similarity between the works lies in their use of conven-
tional devices: the author of an accused work could have copied the
devices from any number of sources, not only from the copyrighted
work.245 Suppose, though, that the plaintiff could prove beyond ques-
tion that the defendant copied a device, such as the superhero cape,
from the plaintiff's copyrighted work. Once again, infringement should
not lie, for two reasons. First, the device cannot be used to distinguish
the copyrighted work from others in the marketplace, because by defi-
nition the device appears in works other than the copyrighted work.
The purpose of protecting the market for copyrighted works would not
be served by protecting a feature that is incapable of inducing a person
to use the copyrighted work in preference to other, similar works. A
second reason relates to the concept of originality.246 In copyright, the
requirement of originality is thought to be essentially trivial. The copy-
right registration - which is not reviewed substantially by the Copy-
right Office - constitutes prima facie evidence of originality,241 7 and the
burden is on the defendant to prove absence of originality.24 The con-
cept of scenes a faire, however, gives content to this otherwise trivial
requirement. It would be incredible for an author (who presumably is
reasonably widely read) to claim that he invented out of whole cloth a
standard literary (or video game) device that he could have taken from
any number of previously published works.249 Thus, a court can deny
relief under the scenes a faire concept without at the same time overtly
245 See B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 44.
24 Both courts and commentators have been leery of introducing to copyright any doctrine as
stringent as the criterion of novelty in patent law. Compare Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910), afld, 183 F. 107 (2d Cir. 1910) (Hand, J., applying an "invention" test)
with Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Hand, J., avoiding a strict test
of novelty). These cases are discussed in B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 41-44. See also 3 M.
NIMMER, supra note 10, § 16.08[B], at 16-58. The courts have avoided such a doctrine with good
reason-as Kaplan puts it, "[i]f [novelty] is a difficult, perhaps an illusory, measure in the field of
mechanical improvements, how much harder would it be in literature or the other arts." B.
KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 43. Copyright "originality" differs from patent "novelty," in that the
former requires only that the author did not copy from the prior art, whereas the latter requires
that he could not have. See Filmon Process Corp. v. Spellright Corp., 274 F. Supp. 312, 313
(D.D.C. 1967) (patent law requires the applicant to be first inventor as well as an original one),
afrd, 404 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Russell v. Trimfit, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 91, 93 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (copyright protects from copying only whereas patent protects from any infringement), aff'd,
568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978); Fred Fisher, Inc., 298 F. at 150; see also B. KAPLAN, supra note 10,
at 43-44.
247 See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 139 (D.N.J. 1982).
248 See id.
249 This is like the grounds on which judge Hand held for the plaintiff in Fred Fisher, Inc.:
he believed that the accused author, Jerome Kern, did not remember taking from the plaintiff's
copyrighted song "Dardanella," but concluded that the taking must have been unconscious. See
298 F. at 147.
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expanding the concept of originality or upsetting the presumption of
originality arising from registration.
Scenes a faire thus play a vital role in cases in which courts at-
tempt to draw the line between actionable and permissible borrowing.
The identification of standard literary devices for the copyrighted
work's genre provides the context in which the author created his work
and in which the work will be presented to its audience. With an eye
on this context, the court may with a steadier hand draw a line between
idea and expression responsive to copyright policy. The context gives
the court a feel for what the author created, and for which he therefore
deserves a reward. It also helps the court to judge what type of in-
fringement would adversely affect sales of the work. One might say that
in a case like O'Neill or Warner Brothers the idea/expression distinc-
tion loses its arid metaphysical quality - what Kaplan calls its "aba-
cadabra"'25 -and becomes tangible. If Hand's continuum frames the
discussion of ideas and expressions, scenes a faire fill in the picture,
adding perspective and horizon. At the same time, scenes a faire subtly
expand the exception to copyright protection by intimating the more
sensitive issues of originality and novelty. To use an old metaphor,
when effectively used, scenes a faire put meat on the bare bones of the
Copyright Act's idea/expression scheme.
If scenes a faire are so helpful in drawing the idea/expression line,
why haven't they assisted courts in drawing that line in the video game
context? The answer lies in the manner by which courts habitually
acquaint themselves with the relevant context. As exemplified by
O'Neill, for traditional literary works courts examine the copyrighted
and allegedly infringing works against the background of their own lit-
erary knowledge. Expert testimony and time-consuming testimony on
"extrinsic" issues such as comparisons of the copyrighted and accused
works with other works of a similar type are disfavored. 51 The O'Neill
court rejected the plaintiff's request for additional discovery, comment-
ing, "[i]t is difficult to understand how additional evidence, whatever it
might be, could change the written words of the two novels."252 The
court concluded:
Nor can the testimony of an expert provide what is clearly lacking.
2 B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 56.
281 See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930). But see
Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat'l Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir.) (expert
testimony admitted on conventions in ornithological art), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977)
(commenting that "analytical dissection and expert testimony are appropriate" to determine
whether ideas in two works are substantially similar).
I'l O'Neill, 630 F.2d at 690.
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Although we may not be qualified literary critics, we are fitted by
training and experience to compare literary works and determine
whether they evidence substantial similarity. We share Learned
Hand's feeling that, in this type of case, expert evidence ought gen-
erally to be excluded.25
The exclusion of extrinsic evidence and of expert testimony is ap-
propriate for traditional literary and audiovisual works because the
court's own expertise provides the context within which the line be-
tween idea and expression may be assayed intelligently. One may ques-
tion, however, whether courts are "fitted by training and experience to
compare ' " very new forms of expression such as video games. The
wide swings of precedent in video game cases suggest that they are not.
Missing in many video game opinions is a confident sense of the extent
to which two video games are more or less similar to each other than
they are to other video games.255 Missing also is a sense of the "public
domain" and "scenes a faire" for video games." 6 If, as has been sug-
gested, context and scenes a faire help to give substance and particular-
ity to the otherwise vacant concept of an "idea," then courts that lack a
sense of context will have difficulty filling in a region of unprotected
"ideas" for video games.2 57 To return to the Venn diagram analogy, the
"ideas" exception to the Copyright Act's otherwise universal protection
becomes a null set, and the extreme overbreadth of the holdings in,cases
such as Stern Electronics, and Armenia may result. To put it more
simply, any two video games will appear similar to a judge who has
seldom seen, much less played, a video game. To the video game con-
noisseur, which many of the players - the video game "audience" -
seem to be, the same two games may exhibit intriguing differences. By
analogy, if one rarely views TV soap operas, any two soap operas
might seem highly and infringingly similar. Only persons who regu-
larly watch soap operas seem to appreciate the unique features of each.
253 Id.
254 Id.
215 But see Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982), in
which the court compares Midway's "Galaxian" game with a preexisting work, "Space Invaders,"
and with Bandai's subsequent game, also called "Galaxian." Compare id. at 144 with id. at 146-
47.
25 Cf North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 617 ("Certain expressive matter in the Pac-
Man work, however, should be treated as scenes a faire and receive protection only from virtually
identical copying.").
2. The only courts that seem to have successfully undertaken this task are the Seventh Cir-
cuit in the North American Philips case, see 672 F.2d at 617 (describing the abstract "idea"
underlying the Pac-Man "maze chase" game, quoted supra in the text accompanying note 171),
and the opinion of the District Court in Bandai-America, see 546 F. Supp. at 148 (describing the
idea of Midway's Galaxian game: "it is an outer space video game in which the player controls a
rocket ship defending itself against a swarm of computer-controlled attacking aliens who attempt
to bomb and collide with the player's ship.").
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One may conclude that the protection for video games has often
been overbroad, and that the occasional discussions of ideas in the video
game cases have been hollow and unsatisfying in part because, on the
one hand, the courts' experience with the games is too limited to take
judicial notice of standard devices comparable to the Rip Van Winkle
theme of literature and, on the other hand, the courts have been de-
terred by precedent and habit from supplementing their own knowledge
with extrinsic evidence and expert testimony.
Several of the video game cases provide a notable exception to this
trend, in that they carefully distill the unprotected ideas from the copy-
righted video games, and acknowledge that copyright protection cannot
extend to those ideas. Thus, in North American Philips and in Bandai-
America the ideas in Pac-Man and Galaxian were abstracted and de-
scribed.2 58 These opinions are also unusual in their attempts to "con-
sider the nature of the protected material and the context in which it
appears"" as an additional step toward distinguishing ideas from pro-
tectible expression. It is perhaps from this sense of "context" that the
court in North American Philips asserted that "[t]he main attraction of
a game such as Pac-Man lies in the stimulation provided by the inten-
sity of the competition." 26
It is submitted that in unusual contexts, such as video games, the
admission of evidence, both expert and otherwise, about other works
similar to the copyrighted and accused works, should become standard
practice. 261 Such evidence would provide valuable information about
the standard devices (scenes a faire) found in games similar to the ones
involved in the suit at hand. Such evidence would also allow the courts
to place their comparison of the copyrighted and allegedly infringing
games into the context in which the games are actually created and
played.2 62 The routine use of such evidence would guard against over-
25 See supra text accompanying note 171 and supra note 257.
" North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 619; see also Bandai-America, 546 F. Supp. at 149.
260 North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 619; see supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
261 It is generally said that proving substantial similarity, to which such evidence would be
directed, is part of the plaintiff's burden of proof in an infringement action. See 3 M. NIMMER,
supra note 10, § 13.01[B], at 13-6. However, the nature of these issues would require the plaintiff
to prove a negative-that the similarities between the accused and copyrighted works cannot be
explained by a genre, scenes a faire, and the like. For this reason, the most telling evidence on
either of these points is likely to be introduced by the defendant.
262 An example of the effective use of such testimony in a copyright case is Franklin Mint
Corp. v. Nat'l Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880
(1978), discussed supra note 251. In another case, Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546
F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982), the court liberally entertained evidence of games similar to those
before it, but considered that evidence only on the narrow issue of copyright originality. See, e.g.,
id. at 151. The court did not expressly use the evidence of other works to identify unprotected
scenes a faire, although it achieved the same effect by limiting its injunctive relief to the "original"
elements of the copyrighted work (Pac-Man). See id. at 153.
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broad copyright protection, and at the same time facilitate a less meta-
physical and more policy-oriented approach to infringement issues.
Over time, as the courts' experience catches up with new medium, the
need for such evidence can be expected to diminish.
2. Not all Rules are Copyright Ideas
One may criticize all of the video game decisions rendered to date
for their failure to provide convincing analyses of the issue of substan-
tial similarity. Even decisions such as those in Amusement World and
at the trial and appellate levels in North American Philips, which min-
utely compare the games in question, fail to explain why they drew
where they did the line between ideas and expressions. However, the
early decisions' reluctance to apply dogmatically to video games the
principle that "copyright does not protect games" is more justifiable. As
a direct consequence of the facts that video games are a new field and
that their creation requires enormous effort and expense,263 original
works of authorship are evident in the games' rules and methods of
play. The authors of K.C. Munchkin, for example, invented out of
whole cloth the programmable maze and the moving, accelerating dots
which are central to the play of K.C. Munchkin.264 They also created
such nonessential "graphic" or "pictorial" features of the game as the
face on the central character and "spookier" goblins.265
The time and investment required to create a game like Pac-Man
or K.C. Munchkin, coupled with the fact that creativity tends to be
centered in the games' rules rather than their graphics, suggest that it
may be appropriate for copyright protection to reach some aspects of
the games' "methods of play." Any protection for method of play would
be a departure from the blackletter law that copyright does not protect
games. However, to protect only the shapes and facial expressions of
the munchkins and munchers might be an inadequate inducement to,
and reward for, the creation of a game such as K.C. Munchkin or Pac-
Man. If the scope of protection is not broad enough to encourage the
creation of new games, then creativity will be deterred just as surely as
it will be deterred by an overbroad protection of existing games.
2" See supra text accompanying notes 39-44; see also the North American Philips district
court's description of the creation of K.C. Munchkin, 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (OCH) % 25,363, at
17,046-48.
I" See North American Philips, 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 11 25,363, at 17,046-47. The
court's opinion notes that Mr. Averett had invested in an earlier maze-chase game called "Take
the Money and Run," see id. at 17,047, but the opinion does not indicate whether this game
antedated Pac-Man, nor does it indicate whether any other maze-chase game had preceded the
development of Pac-Man.
2I See id. at 17,046-47; supra text accompanying notes 136-38 & 188.
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It should be possible to extend copyright protection to some rule-
like aspects of video games without doing great violence to the statutory
principles that copyright does not protect "ideas" and "methods of op-
eration." As noted above, an "idea" for copyright purposes must have a
minimum level of generality. Not all of the rules and methods of play
of a video game necessarily reach this level of generality. An example of
a very particularized rule is the principle in the Asteroids game that
when hit a large rock splits into two medium rocks, which when hit
split into smaller rocks, which when hit again disappear.26 For reasons
already discussed at length, deciding whether this rule ought to be pro-
tected requires some knowledge of similar games employing similar
rules (i.e., knowledge of context), but it seems likely that such a rule
might be protected without savaging the principle that copyright does
not protect "ideas." In other words, not all rules and methods of play
are necessarily "ideas" for copyright purposes.267
On the other hand, the broad statutory prohibition against any
protection for "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle or discovery '2 8 must not be short changed. The
purpose of copyright is to foster creativity, and this purpose will be
achieved in the highest degree if protection is no broader than necessary
to create an incentive for the creation of new works. In the context of
video games, this suggests that, at most, only the most narrowly partic-
ular method of play or rule should qualify for copyright protection.
As discussed above, the Seventh Circuit in North American
Philips thoughtfully applied the idea/expression distinction to the video
games before it, considering doctrines such as scenes a faire and the
policies underlying the Copyright Act. Yet the court's analysis utli-
mately failed, extending such broad protection to the plaintiffs' Pac-
Man that it appeared to require many original features of the defen-
dants' K.C. Munchkin game to be abandoned as well.269 This result
266 See supra text accompanying note 121.
267 The Copyright Act proscribes protection for "sculptural" features that cannot be "identi-
fied separately from, [or be] capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
%,orks). If video games were considered graphic works, and if the rules of play were considered
"utilitarian" for purposes of the Copyright Act, then copyright protection of video games could be
very limited indeed. Cf I M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.18[H][3][a]. Note, however, that courts
invariably characterize video games as audiovisual works, and that § 102(a) of the Copyright Act
does not require the expression of an idea to be "capable of existing independently of" the idea
itself. See supra text accompanying note 50; see also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 10,
§ 2.18[H][3[b].
268 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
269 North American Philips has since introduced a new game, "K.C.'s Krazy Chase!" that
incorporates some aspects of the mazes developed for K.C. Munchkin. See Blanchet, Drats! Avoid
them or you're out of Luck, Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 7, 1982, at P8, col. 1.
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reflects two further difficulties in video game copyright adjudication
that lead courts to create overbroad remedies on behalf of plaintiffs
whose copyrights have been to some degree infringed: the use of copy-
right to remedy trademark infringement, and the "ordinary observer
test" as a prescription for remedies, rather than as a litmus test of in-
fringement. To these errors we will now turn.
B. Copyright Infringement, Inequitable Conduct, and Unfair
Competition
One of the lessons of the video game cases is that allegations of
copyright infringement are often accompanied by circumstances sug-
gesting trademark infringement or other unfair methods of competition.
In Stern Electronics, the defendant had adopted "Scramble 2" as a
mark for the game accused of violating Stern's copyright in the game
"Scramble." Scramble 2 is not only so similar to Scramble that a buyer
would assume that the products came from the same source; the use of
the numeral "2" also suggests that the defendant's game was a later or
better edition that should be purchased in preference to the plaintiff's
game.2 70 In Dirkschneider, the defendants had for one game adopted
the plaintiff's mark (Rally X) exactly and for another game had
adopted a mark (Galactic Invaders) very similar to the plaintiff's
(Galaxian). The court also found trademark infringement in the defen-
dant's appropriation of the plaintiff's game characters. 271 With regard
to North American Philips, a strong argument can be made that if the
creators of K.C. Munchkin had transgressed, the wrong lay in their
appropriation of Pac-Man's characters, seen as trademarks, rather than
in the infringement of Pac-Man's copyright.272
If one judges by what the courts said in these cases, the trademark
infringement issues seem to be treated as an after thought at best, 273
riding on the coat tails of the courts' copyright infringement holdings.
In Stern Electronics and Dirkschneider, the courts addressed trademark
issues only briefly toward the ends of the opinions; the North American
2 0 It is generally said that trademark law serves two purposes: protecting the public against
false designation of origin and protecting the goodwill of the person who is first to use the mark in
connection with particular goods or services. The defendant's conduct in Stern Electronics was
flagrantly inconsistent with both of these policies. It traded off the plaintiff's goodwill, and also
carried the implication that the plaintiff's product was outmoded. See supra text accompanying
note 78.
... See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
... See supra text accompanying notes 204-10.
'" See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 871 (3d Cir. 1982), in
which the court noted that "[t]he district court . . . severed plaintiff's claims of copyright infringe-
ment from its claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition. . . .These latter claims
have not yet been adjudicated."
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Philips courts omitted altogether any explicit consideration of the Pac-
Man characters as trademarks. Most striking is the fact that no court
in a video game case has found for the defendant on one type of in-
fringement, but for the plaintiff on the other.
Rather than distinguish and separate their considerations of copy-
right and trademark issues, the courts have tended to decide both ques-
tions together,27' often basing their decisions on an implicit characteri-
zation of the defendant as a "good guy" or a "bad guy."'275 Again, the
practical effect of this habitual all-or-nothing approach is that good
guys are exonerated and bad guys punished, even when such ,an out-
come considered more dispassionately may seem oversimplified.
Equitable considerations about the quality of a litigant's conduct
may be appropriate to consideration of alleged trademark infriljgement,
but less so to alleged copyright infringements. Trademark law and sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act 278 share the broad purposes of protecting
a first user's exclusive right to profit from the goodwill he has gener-
ated and of protecting the public against "false designations of ori-
gin."'2 77 Thus, trademark law recognizes a right in the first user of a
mark to make all of the profit derived from the goodwill associated with
a mark and to prevent unfair or deceptive use of the same or confus-
ingly similar marks by other persons. By contrast, protection for the
economic interests of the copyright owner is more limited. The owner's
profits are not an end in themselves, but only a means to the constitu-
tional goal of encouraging the development of "science and the useful
arts. "278 In a case such as North American Philips, the fact that the
"" Another example of a video game case in which trademark and copyright claims are
joined is Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982). Willams
Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3d Cir. 1982) is an exception because in
that case the court severed the trademark and copyright issues.
"6 This apparent preoccupation with the parties' conduct might result in part from the fact
that the defendants in several cases were guilty of highly inequitable practices. In Stern Electron-
ics, for example, the defendants chose, under circumstances that showed bad faith, a confusingly
similar mark for a work that was already dangerously similar to the plaintiffs' copyrighted works.
See supra note 78 and text accompanying notes 78 & 149. In a dose case, such conduct might
easily tip the balance against the defendants, who will find it difficult under the circumstances to
make high-minded public policy arguments about the evils of overbroad copyright protection. Con-
versely, policy justifications for conduct that may damage a plaintiff's economic interests will al-
ways be more persuasive when urged by a defendant whose conduct otherwise shows solicitude for
the public good by avoiding confusing trademarks and other forms of unfair competition. See
supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
6 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
27 See Warner Bros. Co. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 530 F. Supp. 1187-95 (S.D.N.Y.
1982). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976) (statutory protection against false designations of
origin) with 1 R. CALLMAN, supra note 207, § 1.24 (discussing protection of public from deception
as one of the goals of trademark law). See generally 3 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COM-
PETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 67.5 (3d ed. Supp. 1981) (explaining public policy
bases for protection against trademark infringement and unfair competition).
"8 See supra text accompanying notes 212-14.
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copyright holders made $150 million during a thirteen month period
when the accused work was also on the market 279 does not diminish the
trademark interest in safeguarding the amount of the claimant's profits.
By contrast, $150 million seems sufficient to reward and encourage the
creation of a video game. The copyright policies may therefore be con-
sistent with allowing the alleged infringement to continue.
The copyright concept of character infringement could function in
some cases as a half-way house between copyright and trademark anal-
ysis. As discussed in connection with North American Philips, a court
may find character infringement even if the accused work involves simi-
lar characters in an entirely different "idea," or plot, as long as the
characters are "sufficiently developed to command copyright protec-
tion."28 On the other hand, trademark protection is available for sym-
bols and shapes that are too stylized and simplified to qualify for pro-
tection as copyrighted "characters." Indeed, the best trademarks tend to
be very simple. By contrast, copyright focuses its protection on details;
oversimplified features of a work are often geometrical and abstract,
falling toward the "ideas" end of Hand's abstraction continuum.
Trademark and unfair competition law thus provide protection both to
types of creations (simplified marks) and in types of situations (where
the plaintiff has been amply rewarded despite the alleged infringement)
in which the argument for copyright protection might be comparatively
weak.
Because the goals of trademark and copyright protection are so
different, the courts should not permit the equitable considerations ap-
propriate to trademark law unduly to influence their decisions on copy-
right issues. When the copyright issues are as unusual as they are in
video game cases, any confusion of the two issues will inevitably inter-
fere with the development of a consistent copyright analysis for video
games. A more desirable alternative would be to provide separate reme-
dies for trademark and copyright infringement.281 In appropriate cases,
this might be done by enjoining the defendant's use of the plaintiff's
trademarks and granting damages for infringement or unfair competi-
tion, while at the same time holding (if true) that part or all of the
defendant's work is not "substantially similar" to the plaintiff's for cop-
yright infringement purposes.
'7, See supra text accompanying note 199-200.
'30 See supra text accompanying notes 202-09.
'1 See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. at 154-55.
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C. The Ordinary Observer Test
The all-or-nothing character of relief in many copyright cases has
already been associated with shortcomings in the application of the
idea/expression distinction and with the use of copyright law to remedy
trademark infringement. Perhaps the most potent source of all-or-noth-
ing relief, however, is the "ordinary observer test" for substantial simi-
larity. This test has had a variety of manifestations. In its purest and
perhaps earliest form, it states that actionable copyright infringement
may only be found if the ordinary, reasonable lay person would detect
the plagiarism without the aid of critical analysis or expert testi-
mony.282 Two leading cases, Arnstein v. Porter,"3 and Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,284 modified
the original statement of the test by recognizing that expert testimony
and "dissection" may be appropriate for some limited purposes. In
Arnstein, the Second Circuit separated the question of copying from the
question of infringement. The court held that when "there is evidence
of access and similarities exist," "analysis (dissection) is relevant, and
the testimony of experts may be received," to aid the trier of fact in
determining whether "the similarities are sufficient to prove copy-
ing.' '2  The court held, however, that once copying is established, the
issue of "unlawful appropriation" must be decided by "the response of
the ordinary lay [observer]; accordingly, on that issue, 'dissection' and
expert testimony are irrelevant. '218 In Krofft, the Ninth Circuit ap-
peared to lump together the questions of copying and infringement (ap-
plying the ordinary observer test to both), but allowed expert testimony
and dissection for the limited purpose of determining whether there
was substantial similarity as to the "general idea" contained in the two
works.28 I
IS See Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933), cited in 3 M. NIM-
MER, supra note 10, § 13.03[E], at 13-40 to 13-41.
154 F.2d 464 (2d. Cir. 1946).
284 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
's' Id.
2" Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164-66. Nimmer criticizes Krofft on the ground that similarity in the
works' "general ideas" is irrelevant to infringement, since copyright does not protect "general
ideas" in any event. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03[E], at 13-49 n.121.3. In this,
Nimmer is surely correct, although the mistake he identifies is so elementary that it is difficult to
believe that the Ninth Circuit meant what it said. It seems more likely that the court meant to
allow expert testimony to help bridge the gap between a basic work (perhaps a novel) and its
derivatives (movies, plays). Considered in this way, the Krofft test is directed at the problem that
mainly troubles Nimmer about the ordinary observer test - that the layman might not, without
expert coaching, perceive that a difference between the copyrighted and accused works might be
required by the technical demands of a different medium and might not, therefore, weigh against
infringement. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03[E], at 13-45. Nimmer's point may be
valid on the issue of proof of copying, but one might question why technically required differences
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Subject to variations like those in Arnstein and Krofft, and despite
persistent criticism,2"8 the courts have continued placing great emphasis
on the uncritical reactions of the "ordinary lay observer." Although
typically stated as a unitary "test" for substantial similarity,"" the or-
dinary observer approach is a complex of several policy decisions about
the nature of, and proper remedies for, copyright infringement. Funda-
mentally, it embodies a philosophy about the nature of copyright pro-
tection. That is, courts have emphasized the reactions of the lay ob-
server because they have found that copyright is intended to protect the
copyright holder's market, which, the courts assume, is comprised of
"ordinary observers." The identification between the market for copy-
righted work and the ordinary observer is so strong that the "ordinary
observer test" is also referred to as the "audience test,"290 reflecting the
belief that the audience for a copyrighted work and the ordinary ob-
server are essentially the same.
The test is invariably categorized as a method for determining
whether the accused work infringes the copyrighted work. However,
the test also carries implications about the proper remedies for infringe-
ment. This second dimension is not stated explicitly in the published
opinions, but it may be perceived in the curious manner by which
courts ask their hypothetical ordinary observer to compare the accused
and infringed works. Courts say that infringement will be found only if
the accused work's "general design, style and tone . . . is such that an
average lay observer would be likely to recognize [it] as having been
derived from [the copyrighted work]." 29 1 Pursuing this theme, courts
remind themselves not to assess the two works "hypercritically or with
meticulous scrutiny," 292 but to determine instead "whether the accused
work has captured the 'total concept and feel' of the copyrighted
work. '293 The test thus requires the hypothetical ordinary observer to
should not weigh against infringement as much as whimsical differences. The author of the ac-
cused work put in the additional effort in either case, and it seems unfair to penalize him for
meeting the technical demands of his medium. Ridden far enough, this train of thought can lead
one to question why the author of, for example, a novel should not be required to write a screen-
play before he acquires rights in the movie derived from his novel, particularly when extensive
revision is required and the novel and movie share little more than title, character names, and
highlights of plot. But this raises the general question of protection for derivative works, which is
beyond the scope of this Article. See generally B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 56-58; id. at 6-12
(historical nonprotetion of abridgements).
* See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03[E], at 13.41-.46.
See, e.g., North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 614.
SM See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, at § 13.03[E].
2,x Jack Lenor Larsen, Inc. v. Dakotah, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 99, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164 (quoting Stonesifer v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 140
F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1944)).
2'3 North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 614 (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card
Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970)).
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consider each work in its entirety so as to ascertain not its details but,
so to speak, its gestalt.
This holistic approach to infringment is not a logically required
implication of the selection of the ordinary observer as the principal
judge of copyright infringement: surely the lay observer is capable of
judging whenever a chapter of an accused work is similar to a chapter
of the copyrighted work. Whatever its origins, however, this explicit
element of the test for infringement has come to bear a vital implicit
message about the proper remedy for infringement. If the ordinary and
reasonable person finds the accused and copyrighted works to vary in
overall design, the defendant gets off scot free, no matter how many
details he may have borrowed from the plaintiff. If the ordinary person
finds the works to be the same, the powerful equitable remedies of the
Copyright Act (injunction, and impoundment or destruction of infring-
ing copies) are oftentimes applied to the whole accused work, regardless
of how many noninfringing elements it may also contain.2 94 This impli-
cation about infringement remedies is the silent partner of the ordinary
observer test for infringement itself.
The "ordinary observer" test is thus at once both an impressionis-
tic approach to the issue of actionable infringement and a wholesale
approach to the remedy for infringement. In each aspect, it serves use-
ful purposes. In the first place, it is - and should be -a sine qua non
for copyright infringement. The "ordinary observer" is, of course, a
projection of the trier of fact (usually the judge himself).2" 5 If to his
untrained but presumably impartial and perspicacious eye the works do
not appear to be similar, and if he is not led to believe that the accused
work copied substantially from the copyrighted one, then it can be ar-
gued that the copying, if any, was either too slight or too subtle to be
the proper subject of copyright protection. Copyright is designed in part
to protect the income of an author's work. Often, the economic success
of a work (a novel, a play, a movie, a television series, a how-to book)
will depend on whether "ordinary" people like the judge or members of
a jury will buy it, watch it, or use it. In such cases, copyright protects
the market for the work among "ordinary observers," and if they would
not perceive the accused work as a substitute for the original, then the
'" Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982) is an excep-
tion to the generalization. In that case the court tailored the relief more carefully.
'91 Indeed, every video game opinion to date has been rendered on a motion for a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction, so that the trier of fact in every one of these cases has
been a federal district court judge. For works such as video games, which have a profitable life
measured in months rather than years, see North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 620, and Stern
Electronics, 523 F. Supp. at 638, it is likely that the ordinary observer will always be the judge,
since the fighting issue of market share will have disappeared before a trial can be had.
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economic harm potentially caused to the copyrighted work becomes at-
tenuated and the strength of the justification for banning the accused
work diminishes.29' Thus, for many works, there is sound justification
in policy for stressing the ordinary observer's reaction.
The ordinary observer approach has secondary benefits as well. It
encourages judicial economy and avoids interminable expert testimony.
A procession of English professors (or computer programmers) on the
witness stand, each competing with the other for the most precious
comparison between the accused and copyrighted works, is a judge's
nightmare that probably exerts a powerful disincentive against expert
testimony and "dissection." The test may also afford a court a psycho-
logical advantage in the exercise of judicial discretion. As mentioned
above, the test allows the judge to project his personality into the shell
of the "ordinary observer." In that guise, the judge can exercise per-
sonal judgment - which is surely indispensable to his work - without
relinquishing the court's outward appearance of impartiality. Thus, the
test protects the judge against the dangers of stating openly, "I think
these works are so similar I would as soon buy the accused one as the
copyrighted one" and allows himself to say instead, "The court finds
that an ordinary lay observer would as soon buy one as the other.1
297
The ordinary observer test's wholesale approach to relief may also
help to defer infringement. If a would-be plagiarist knows that any
borrowing from a copyrighted work could jeopardize his entire work,
including even those portions that are original, he may be assisted in
overcoming the temptation to profit from the success of others. Thus,
the in terrorem effect of a wholesale approach may reduce the need for
authors (who by reputation are impecunious) to file expensive lawsuits
to protect their copyrighted works.
Despite these many advantages, the ordinary observer test has
profound limitations. Nimmer, for example, argues that the test may
fail to uncover instances of copying, such as the conversion of a novel
into a derivative work such as a movie, in which "the immediate and
spontaneous observations of a person untrained in the special require-
ments and techniques of the play, the novel, the short story, and the
motion picture, may fail to note similarities which, if analyzed and dis-
sected, would be only too apparent. ' 29 The application of the ordinary
observer test in the video games cases suggests that in other circum-
" See 3 M. NiMMER, supra note 10, § 13.05[A][4], at 13-64.
"7 This psychological advantage may help to explain the prevalence of "ordinary observer"
or "ordinary reasonable man" tests in many areas of the law. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 10,
§ 13.03[E], at 13-43 (comparing the ordinary observer test in copyright with similar tests in torts
and criminal law, among others).
"1 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03[E], at 13-45. But see supra note 287.
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stances it may incline the court too much in the direction of finding
infringement. The most avid video game users seem to be pre-teens and
teen-agers, not the middle-aged adults who occupy the federal bench
and jury box. As discussed above in connection with scenes a faire, two
games that appear similar (and perhaps equally pointless) to a distin-
guished member of the federal judiciary might to the thirteen year old
enthusiast show stimulating and laudable diversity. 99 Furthermore, the
games are created by computer programmers, a breed notorious for the
opacity of its language and processes to the "ordinary observer." The
"ordinary observer"-the judge-might not have a good sense as to
whether one work was "copied" from another. He would need expert
testimony to help resolve the issue.
As exemplified by Amusement World and by the court of appeals
decision in North American Philips, the all-or-nothing relief implied by
the ordinary observer test cuts across the line between idea and expres-
sion, no matter how carefully the court's opinion may have been to
draw that line. This blurring is, undesirable for several reasons. It can
be unjust. In Amusement World, the copyright holder obtained no re-
lief, even though some aspects of its game Asteroids had obviously been
copied by the creator of the accused work Meteors. At the opposite
extreme, the appellate decision in North American Philips deprived the
defendants of any reward for their creation of the many unique features
in K.C. Munchkin - features the district court had found to be chal-
lenging and, one infers, superior to similar features in Pac-Man.
300
Thus, the in terrorem effect of the wholesale approach tends to deter
the creation of new video games and to foster monopolization by the
first promoter of each type of game.301
Finally, the wholesale approach to infringement and relief can re-
tard the development of a consistent body of law in any new area such
as copyright protection for video games. This effect is evident in the
video game decisions rendered to date. If one considers together cases as
diametrically opposed as, on the one hand, Stern Electronics, Armenia,
and the North American Philips court of appeals opinion, and on the
other hand, Amusement World, and the North American Philips dis-
trict court opinion, it is most difficult to advise a client what it may and
2" See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1166 ("both plaintiffs' and defendants' works are directed to an
audience of children. This raises the particular factual issue of the impact of the respective works
upon the minds and imaginations of young people.").
3" See, e.g., the district court's comment that in K.C. Munchkin, unlike in Pac-Man, the last
dot "cannot be caught by overtaking it, it must be munched by strategy." North American Philips,
2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,163, at 17,047. See generally supra text accompanying notes
134-42.
s0 See supra text following note 84.
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may not do in creating and marketing video games. To borrow a phrase
from physics, the test is dynamically unstable. A slight push one way or
the other seems capable of toppling the entire case one way or the
other. When the law is in such a state, the lawyer's only safe advice is
to avoid similarity with existing games altogether. This is undoubtedly
what the pioneers in the field would like, but it is wholly inconsistent
with the Copyright Act's policy of distinguishing ideas and expressions,
protecting the latter, and at the same time opening the way for creativ-
ity in and development of the former.
These limitations suggest that, at least in untried situations such
as video game cases, and especially in assessing requests for equitable
relief, courts should relegate the ordinary observer test to a more lim-
ited role. In most cases, similarity between the accused and copyrighted
works as seen by the court (wearing its guise as "ordinary observer")
ought to remain the touchstone, the sine qua non for infringement3 02
The video game cases suggest, however, that additional questions must
be answered before an ultimate finding of copyright infringement may
be reached, and before relief may be entered. In some cases, such as the
North American Philips court of appeals opinion, the superficial simi-
larity that an ordinary observer would perceive between the games
leads to the question whether the infringement lay in the appropriation
of the plaintiff's copyright or of its trademarks. In other cases, such as
Stern Electronics, the preliminary finding of similarity between the
games should have provided the basis for asking whether the similarity
lay in the unprotected realm of ideas and scenes a faire. In still other
cases, such as Amusement World, the finding that there was similarity,
and that some of it lay in the realm of ideas, should not have precluded
a consideration whether other elements of the accused work had im-
properly appropriated the copyrighted work's expression.
A better approach in each of these cases would have been to treat
the ordinary observer's reaction as a preliminary inquiry. Both the
question of copying and the ordinary observer test for substantial simi-
larity should ideally be followed by consideration of several other is-
sues. The analysis would include the following questions: (i) has copy-
ing or access been proved; (ii) would the ordinary observer consider the
works to be similar; (iii) is the similarity confined to the trademark-like
elements in the work; (iv) does the remaining similarity inhere in the
works' ideas or in the expression of those ideas; (v) if the similarity is
in the realm of copyrighted expression, can relief be entered that will
*02 It might be necessary to make an exception even to this limited role for the ordinary
observer in the instances in which the copying could be observed only by technical analysis of the
copyist's medium. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 13.03, at 13-45. But see supra note 287.
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remedy the appropriation of the copyrighted work's expression without
interfering with the public interest in the exploitation of the work's
ideas?
The suggestion of a program for discussion like the foregoing one
is inevitably more stilted than a convincing legal opinion could or
should be. It can serve, however, as a checklist for considerations that
are relevant and important and that, if one judges from the video game
cases, are often overlooked. In practice, it would yield remedies in copy-
right infringement cases which are now more narrowly drawn but per-
haps more frequently awarded than has been typical in the past. The
following section of this Article will consider whether such remedies are
consistent with the Copyright Act.
D. Targeting the Remedy to the Wrong
The moral of the preceding sections of this Article is that habits of
copyright adjudication have inclined the courts toward all-or-nothing
remedies for infringement, and that such remedies are inimical to the
policies underlying copyright protection. The alternative would be more
carefully tailored infringement remedies. It is worth inquiring whether
such remedies are feasible as a practical matter and whether support
for them can be found in the remedial provisions of the Copyright Act.
Let us suppose we have the following case. The plaintiff alleges
copyright infringement of a video game. The court has read this Article
and has taken to heart the recommendations made above. It has reached
the following tentative conclusions. Access has been proven, and the
"ordinary observer" would find the accused and copyrighted works to
be similar. The defendant has been guilty of trademark infringement,
but after carefully excising the trademarks from the accused work there
remain elements similar to the copyrighted work. The court has heard
both extrinsic evidence and expert testimony comparing these remain-
ing elements with standard devices found in similar games. On the ba-
sis of the context provided by this evidence, the court finds that some of
the remaining elements are unprotected "ideas," some are material cre-
ated by the defendant, and others are "expression" subject to copyright
protection and copied from the plaintiff's copyrighted work. What
should the court do?
Relief can be patterned on one of three models. The court could
find that the accused work as a whole infringes the copyrighted work.
This would lead to an injunction banning further marketing of the ac-
cused work and ordering the destruction of all copies in the defendant's
possession. Alternatively, the court could find infringement only with
respect to the individual elements in the accused work that are similar
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to elements in the copyrighted work. This would suggest an injunction
against further marketing of any work that included those elements
and, possibly, ordering the destruction of any copies of the accused
work in the defendant's possession that included those elements. Fi-
nally, the court could find the copying to be de minimus, accord the
plaintiff no injunctive relief, but perhaps award the plaintiff nominal
damages.
Perhaps the most important question is how large a portion of the
accused work represents plagiarized material, and whether anything of
value would remain if the copied portion were excised. If, on the one
hand, the improperly copied material is a tiny fraction of the entire
accused work, then no injunctive relief might be entered at all, because
any injunction would impose an unfair hardship on the defendant. At
the opposite extreme, there would be no point in attempting to salvage
any part of a work that was plagiarized virtually in its entirety. The
extraordinary copying described by the court in Dirkschneider may be
an example of the latter extreme. 03
In many cases, the copying can be expected to fall between these
poles. Examples of video game cases in which the accused work was
partially copied from the copyrighted work, but contained substantial
amounts of other material that was either original or not subject to
copyright protection, are North American Philips and Amusement
World. In such cases, a strong argument can be made that relief that is
targeted to the infringing elements is in fact mandated by the Copyright
Act. Section 502 of the Act empowers the court to "grant temporary
and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to pre-
vent or restrain infringements of a copyright."3E0 This language plainly
contemplates a flexible and "reasonable" application of injunctive re-
lief. The destruction or impoundment of copies "made or used in viola-
tion of the copyright owner's exclusive rights" pursuant to section
503305 seems more suited to eradication of the defendant's work as a
whole, but even with regard to that language there may be room for
flexibility. Destruction or impoundment is not required by the Act: sec-
tion 503 provides that the court "may" order such relief.306 Further-
more, a video game, unlike a published book or record, can be modified
without destroying the entire device. For example, a court might order
the impoundment or destruction of the microchips that operate a
303 See supra text accompanying notes 85-90.
3- 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
305 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3-' See id.
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game, 3 7 while allowing the defendant to keep the devices to which the
chips are connected and to replace the chips with new chips embodying
programs for games that do not include the game's infringing features.
These statutory considerations thus support the view that, whenever
possible, injunctive relief should be limited to the infringing elements in
the accused work.308
Courts are fond of reciting that "no plagiarist can excuse the
wrong by showing how much of the work he did not pirate," 809 and it
might be felt that limited forms of injunctive relief would not suffi-
ciently punish an infringer. The Copyright Act suggests, however, that
Congress wished to emphasize damages and criminal penalties, not in-
junctions, as the preferred means of punishing infringement. For will-
ful infringement, the Act provides startling statutory damages of up to
$50,000, even if no actual damages can be shown, 10 and criminal pen-
alties of up to $250,000 or five years imprisonment, or both. 11 Using
these tools, a genuinely punitive blow can be dealt to any infringer even
if injunctive relief is limited to the infringing elements of the accused
work. Aside from the draconian statutory damage provisions, congres-
sional intent that the Act's damage provisions be a preferred method of
punishment is also seen in the Act's provisions for the allocation of an
infringer's profits. Congress recognized that it may not as a practical
matter be possible to determine what portion of a defendant's profits
were "attributable to the infringement." '12 The Copyright Act has re-
solved this problem in favor of the plaintiff by requiring the plaintiff to
prove only "the infringer's gross revenue," placing on the infringer the
burden of proving "the elements of profit attributable to factors other
than the copyrighted work."313 One can conclude that Congress in-
tended to punish infringers through damages, and, where appropriate,
criminal prosecution, while leaving the door open to comparatively
nonpunitive forms of injunctive relief.
Undoubtedly there will be cases in which the infringing elements
in the accused work are so interwoven with the noninfringing elements
'07 See supra note 11.
'" For an example of a video game case in which injunctive relief was limited to certain
elements of the copyrighted and accused works, see Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc.,
546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982).
309 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49,56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 669 (1936), quoted in North American Philips, 672 F.2d at 619.
310 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (making willful infringement for com-
mercial advantage or private financial gain a crime); Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, § 3, 96 Stat. 91, 93 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2319) (specifying
criminal penalties).
312 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
313 Id.
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that the court could not issue an injunction directed against only the
infringing elements without rewriting the entire work. Such cases, how-
ever, are probably the exception rather than the rule, at least in the
video game context. 314 If one judges by the meticulous detail with
which the courts segregated and categorized infringing and noninfring-
ing features in cases such as Amusement World, Dirkschneider, and
the two North American Philips, opinions, the identification of infring-
ing features in an injunction should not be viewed as an impossible
task. It might raise the spectre of a defendant attempting to skirt
around the edges of the list thereafter, but this risk is present whenever
injunctive relief is entered. On balance, the risk of an end-run around
the terms of the injunction seems a small price to pay for an outcome
that is otherwise more consistent with the rights of the parties and with
the policies supporting copyright protection.
In sum, the interplay of the Copyright Act injunction and damage
provisions strongly supports the conclusion that, whenever possible,
courts should enter limited injunctive relief while at the same time pun-
ishing willful infringement by the imposition of statutory damages and
by the liberal application of the Act's provisions regarding the measure
of actual damages.
IV. END NOTES
Early in this Article, video games were compared with the situa-
tions in the leading cases cited for the blackletter rule that "copyright
does not protect games." There were many differences, all pointing to-
ward greater protection for video games. Those differences forecast that
the application of law to facts in video game cases would not be smooth
sailing. The cases bore out that prediction. The courts could be seen
struggling to accommodate the need for protection for the games to the
proscriptions against protecting games, rules, and ideas. One finds in
this struggle support for a few generalizations about the process by
which the law shapes and transforms itself in a new environment. Some
of these generalizations are widely accepted; others may be less so.
The first is that, in the absence of clear guidelines from precedent
or statute, courts find it easier to decide cases by comparing the equita-
ble nature of the parties' conduct than by interpreting the precedents
and statutes in the new context. Thus, many of the seminal video game
decisions, including particularly the early decisions in Stern Electronics
and Artic International, but also including the Seventh Circuit's deci-
314 In the fine arts, separately identifying the protected and copyrighted elements may be
much more difficult, even impossible. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 10, at 56.
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sion in North American Philips, focus on the relative merits of the con-
duct of the parties rather than on the copyright issues. This tendency
provides the basis for the maxim that it is more important (particularly
for a plaintiff) to argue the facts than the law. One might say that the
equitable tail tends to wag the legal dog.
A second is that legal dogma often functions to limit equitable
claims in the interest of public policy. The principle that copyright does
not protect ideas is a good example of a legal rule performing this func-
tion. It serves to protect the salutory constitutional interest favoring the
development of the useful arts. But it is usually asserted against the
claims of a party who has been in some sense cheated. Plagiarism is not
an agreeable occupation, and arguing that the creator of an accused
work stole "only" the plaintiffis ideas hardly mitigates the perceived
fault. The courts must recognize, however, the public interest behind
which the "plagiarist" defends his conduct if the policies of the Copy-
right Act are to be served.
A third generalization, derived from the first two, is that a dra-
matic expansion of legally recognized rights can occur in any new set-
ting where old dogmas cannot be applied with ease, where the plaintiff
has a strong (even self-righteous) claim for protection, and where the
defendant can be characterized as having "profited at the plaintiffs ex-
pense," been "unjustly enriched," "stolen the plaintiff's idea," or en-
gaged in any other inequitable conduct. Again, video game cases such
as Stern Electronics and North American Philips provide vivid exam-
ples of this process at work.
That courts are disposed to provide remedies for new wrongs is a
lively creative force, without which the law would stagnate, and law-
yers would probably go hungry. No set of formulas or suggestions can
or should pretend to eliminate it. Courts can, however, take steps to
soften the disruptive impact strong equitable claims have on old legal
rules. For one thing, they can spread the strain of new claims for pro-
tection over more than one legal right. By drawing on closely related
areas of the law - in copyright cases, concepts such as character in-
fringement, trademark, and unfair competition - the tendency to over-
stretch a single legal right by asking it to do too much work, and to
remedy too many wrongs, might be avoided. Courts can also resist the
temptations of an "all-or-nothing" approach. As the video game cases
amply demonstrate, such an approach seldom fairly balances the claims
of the parties and often interferes with the consistent and proportionate
development of the law.

